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ABSTRACT 
 
 The minority party in the House of Representatives possesses few procedural advantages.  
As a result, it is typically dominated by the majority party.  I argue that the minority controls the 
use of one procedure in the House, the motion to recommit, and that it uses this control to 
strategically cross-pressure members of the majority party.  Ultimately, this cross-pressuring 
places the minority in a win-win situation where they either receive a policy victory or better 
election results.  The results of this project overwhelming support the theory of cross-pressuring 
and indicate that the minority is able to design, implement, and reap the benefits of its own 
strategy in the House. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Cross-Pressuring the Majority: the Minority’s use of the Motion to Recommit  
 
During the 111
th
 Congress, the primary legislative objective of both President Obama and 
the Democratic majority in Congress was to pass extensive healthcare reform.  Specifically, two 
bills were introduced to accomplish this task, the Affordable Healthcare for America Act of 2010 
(AHCAA) in the House of Representatives and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA) in the Senate.  In order to pass the AHCAA, Democrat Bart Stupak (MI) introduced 
the Stupak-Pitts Amendment which would prevent federal funds from covering neither abortions 
nor any insurance plan that covered abortions.  The Stupak-Pitts amendment passed the House, 
along with the AHCAA, however, efforts to add a similar amendment to the PPACA in the 
Senate were defeated.  In the ensuing negotiations between the chambers to reconcile the 
differences in the bills, it became clear that moderate Democrats in the House would not approve 
the Senate bill without including language similar to the Stupak-Pitts amendment, and that liberal 
Senators would not support the inclusion of such language. 
 In order to bridge the divide, Rep. Stupak convinced President Obama to issue an 
executive order very similar to the Stupak-Pitts amendment.  This was done to appease moderate 
and conservative members of the House, while keep liberals in the Senate on board without 
actually adding the language in the legislation.  After President Obama signed Executive Order 
13535, the House attempted to pass the Senate’s PPACA without the Stupak-Pitts amendment 
using the reconciliation process. However, before the Democratic House leadership could obtain 
a final passage vote, the House Republicans offered a motion to recommit with instructions 
containing, among other things, language very similar to the Stupak-Pitts amendment.  If passed, 
the motion to recommit would have amended the PPACA in the House to include the Stupak-
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Pitts language, meaning House Democrats were forced to choose between the executive order or 
including Stupak-Pitts.  Ultimately, the motion to recommit was defeated and the Senate’s 
version of PPACA passed the House through the reconciliation process, only after Stupak made 
a floor speech reassuring moderate members of the House that the executive order would stand. 
     The Republican motion to recommit strategically and intentionally contained the 
language of the Stupak-Pitts amendment.  The motion to recommit was designed to cross-
pressure moderate Democrats in the House who had originally supported the Stupak-Pitts 
amendment.  Specifically, the Republicans hoped to use the motion so that they could paint 
Democratic supporters of the motion as “flip-floppers” on abortion (Allen 2010).  Including 
Stupak-Pitts in the motion to recommit allowed the Republicans to force Democrats to make a 
choice between including the amendment, the policy preferred by the Republicans, or the 
unpopular executive order.  Both pro-life and pro-choice groups and voters from both sides of 
the political spectrum were skeptical of the executive order (NRLC 2010; Franke-Ruta 2010; 
Shear 2010). Thus, the Republicans attempted to place themselves in a win-win situation.  They 
would either obtain a policy victory by codifying Stupak-Pitts or force Democrats to vote against 
a popular amendment, and in essence voting in favor of an unpopular executive order. In the end, 
the Democrats won the policy battle; however, the Republicans were able to make the Democrats 
publicly and electorally vulnerable by using the motion to recommit to force them to publicly 
vote against the Stupak-Pitts amendment. 
This anecdote highlights an important but understudied facet of the House of 
Representatives: the use of the motion to recommit by the minority party.  More importantly it 
illuminates why the minority attempts to use the motion to recommit even though it is rarely 
successful.  Typically, the motion to recommit is thought of as a policy tool; one last attempt for 
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the minority to alter legislation before it is gets a final vote (Krehbiel and Meirowitz 2002).  
However, the motion to recommit rarely passes (Roberts 2005), and therefore rarely allows the 
minority to amend legislation.  This begs the question, if the motion to recommit is rarely 
successful then why does the minority continue to use it.  I argue that the minority party uses the 
motion to recommit because it provides an opportunity to cross-pressure, placing majority party 
members in situations where they must either vote against their constituents or their party.  The 
motion to recommit, consistently allows the minority party to actively cross-pressure the 
majority party.  Thus, the tale of the Stupak-Pitts amendment is actually an account of one 
strategy that the minority party in the House always has available, cross-pressuring. 
Very little is known about minority party strategies in the House and what is known tends 
to focus on policy strategies, not electoral strategies.  Furthermore, existing scholarship indicates 
that minority party strategy is determined by the political setting.  This project attempts to 
expand the extant understanding of the minority party in the House by examining the 
implementation and effects of cross-pressuring.  I argue that cross-pressuring differs from other 
established minority party strategies because it is an electoral strategy that can be implemented at 
any time or setting through the motion to recommit.  Thus, cross-pressuring is an innovative 
theory which reveals the minority party in the House as an active participant in the legislative 
process who can use the tools at its disposal to benefits its electoral standing. 
The Motion to Recommit 
In the House of Representatives, the minority always possesses the prerogative to request 
a motion to recommit (henceforth, MTRs).  The purpose of an MTR is to send legislation back to 
its jurisdictional committee for further consideration.  Three types MTRs exist in the House: 
straight, motions with “forthwith” instructions, and motions with “non-forthwith” instructions. 
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Formally, all three motions (if passed) would send a bill back to standing committee for further 
consideration and prevent a final passage vote from occurring. The instructions, if they are 
included, represent specific commands the committee must follow before sending the bill back to 
the floor. “Forthwith” instructions direct the committee to return the bill to the floor immediately 
upon having completed the included changes. “Non-forthwith” instructions do not include that 
specific instruction. In actual use, however, the consequences of passing an MTR are somewhat 
different. If an MTR with forthwith instructions passed, the bill is not actually sent back to the 
committee. Rather, it is amended immediately on the floor of the chamber in a procedural 
maneuver involving the committee chair. The logic is that the floor has agreed to the instructions 
(usually an amendment to the bill) so there is no need for the committee to meet. The ensuing 
final passage vote is then on the bill as amended by the attached instructions, instead of the 
original legislation. On the other hand, if a straight or non-forthwith MTR passes, typically the 
bill just dies; the committee seldom amends bills sent back to them (Lynch 2008, Oleszek 2011).    
In actuality, the minority almost exclusively relies on MTRs with instructions, seldom using 
straight MTRs, thus this project examines the use of MTRs with instructions.  Table 1.1 provides 
a brief description of the three types of MTRs and their effects. 
The MTR offers the minority a range of favorable outcomes for the minority. At the 
minimum, MTRs allow the minority to consume legislative time with the introduction of, debate 
over and vote on the MTR.  In addition to the potential to alter the legislation, any MTR with 
instructions is guaranteed ten minutes of floor debate, equally divided among opponents and 
proponents, according to House rules.  This benefits the minority because it affords the majority 
less time to pass legislation, thus, the majority is less likely to pass legislation damaging to the 
minority. Additionally, the vote on a motion with instructions (either forthwith or non-forthwith)  
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Table 1.1 MTR Types and Effects 
 
Type of MTR     Effect 
Straight    Sends legislation back to specified jurisdictional 
committee, kills legislation. 
    
Forthwith with instructions Immediately alters legislation to match the instructions 
(amends legislation), followed by vote on House floor. 
    
Non-forthwith with instructions Legislation sent back to jurisdictional committee with 
changes mandated by instructions, floor vote only occurs if 
legislation reported by committee again. 
Source: Lynch (2008) 
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provides the minority party a rare opportunity to force a floor vote on a minority-crafted policy 
position. In the event that the motion passes the minority’s benefits multiply. Straight and non-
forthwith MTRs kill a majority policy proposal which the minority may be opposed to. Forthwith 
MTRs both kill the majority proposal and provide the minority an opportunity to stage a floor 
vote on one of its policy positions. 
 This last possibility has received the most attention in the existing literature because of 
the implications it has for partisan theories of legislative organization. Partisan theories posit that 
the majority party controls a host of procedural tools that allow them to set the House’s agenda 
and thus control the partisan slant of legislation coming out of the House (Cox and McCubbins 
1993, 2005; Rhode 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000). Though the means and nature of 
majority party control vary somewhat among the theories, the end result of both is that the 
majority party uses its tools to secure non-median policy outcomes that favor the majority party. 
However, if the minority party uses the last-mover advantage offered by the MTR to produce a 
minority-preferred outcome, or even one located at the chamber median, then the partisan 
theories’ predictions are incorrect and their validity must be called into question. 
Krehbiel and Meirowitz (2002) critique the partisan theories along these lines. They 
argue that the MTR is the last step to occur before the final passage vote. As such the minority 
can use its prerogative to offer an MTR with forthwith instructions to amend the bill to the 
chamber median’s ideal point, which the minority party prefers to the majority-favored position 
in the bill. If the position represented by the forthwith MTR is indeed the chamber median, the 
following sequence should occur: the MTR passes, the chamber proceeds directly to final 
passage, and the newly-amended bill passes the chamber. Thus all of the agenda setting 
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mechanisms of the majority party are for naught because any objector to the bill can procure a 
median outcome during the penultimate step of the House legislative process 
Krehbiel and Meirowitz present a formal model of their theory, but do not empirically 
test their conclusions. However, the argument has been examined more closely on a theoretical 
basis, and tested empirically, by other scholars. Roberts (2005) and Cox et al. (2007) each argue 
that the logical end of the Krehbiel-Meirowitz argument is that an MTR should be offered on 
every bill that reaches a final passage vote and that these MTRs should all pass with minimum 
wining coalitions. Nevertheless, in the time period examined by Roberts only 31% of bills 
receive an MTR, and only approximately 10% of the motions offered passed. Lynch (2008) 
similarly finds a 9% success rate for MTRs, giving little credence to the Krehbiel-Meirowitz 
theory.  In addition, there is at least some evidence that the majority party is active in limiting 
MTRs’ impact on policy outcomes. It is relatively well-established that the majority party leaders 
whip procedural votes harder than policy votes (Ansolabehere et al. 2001; Jenkins et al 2005; 
Snyder and Groseclose 2000), and votes on MTRs have usually been considered to be procedural 
votes. To the extent that majority party leaders enforce strict party discipline on MTR votes, they 
cannot have the moderating effect that Krehbiel and Meirowitz claim, simply because the 
majority is using its powers to prevent it. More direct evidence of this pattern is uncovered by 
Roberts (2005), who finds that the frequency with which the majority party is defeated on MTR 
votes varies significantly with the “condition” in conditional party government (Roberts 2005). 
This indicates that the majority party does use its prerogatives, when it can, to win these votes. 
These more recent studies (Roberts 2005, Cox et al. 2007, Lynch 2008) reveal two 
important factors regarding MTRs.  First, MTRs rarely pass.  Second, MTRs do not have the 
moderating effect on policy outcomes that Krehbiel and Meirowitz predict.  Since MTRs do not 
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appear to bring the minority a wealth of legislative or policy gains this begs the question, why 
does the minority consistently request MTRs?  I argue that the minority continues to use MTRs, 
despite of their regular failure, in order to cross-pressure moderate members of the majority 
party.  Specifically, the minority attempts to place moderate majority members in a position 
where they are pitted against a policy position preferred by their voters and the wishes of their 
party leaders.   
Understanding why the minority uses the MTR is critical on two fronts.  First, it simply 
reveals more about the intricacies of House procedures. Second, understanding the use of the 
MTR exposes the nature of minority party strategy in the House.  The MTR is the only 
legislative procedure in the House used at the prerogative of the minority party.  Indentifying 
why the minority party uses this prerogative shows what legislative strategies it is consistently 
using and what it hopes to achieve with these strategies.  Therefore, understanding the inner 
workings and the use of MTRs is crucial to comprehending the true nature of the House and the 
relationship between the majority and minority party. 
Minority Party Strategies 
 Congressional scholars routinely neglect the minority party in the House (Krehbiel and 
Wiseman 2005).  Particularly, the legislative strategies of the minority and their procedural 
implementation have received scant examination.  What little research regarding minority party 
strategies exists implies that the minority party is simply a slave to the congressional setting and 
political situation at the time.  While these existing theories show what strategy the minority 
party may use during very limited situations, they do not provide a generalizable theory of 
minority party behavior.  I argue that cross-pressuring is a strategy available to the minority that 
allows it to aggressively seek the majority status and is not bound by any congressional setting.  
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Thus, cross-pressuring through MTRs allows the minority efficient and consistent means to 
obtain the majority position in the House.           
Jones (1970) was the first scholastic study of the minority party in Congress.  Jones states 
that the ultimate goal of any minority party is to obtain the majority status.  He suggests eight 
strategies that the minority party can choose from when dealing with any given piece of 
legislation in order to help obtain the majority.  These strategies include supporting the majority, 
inconsequential opposition, complete withdrawal from the process, coalition building with the 
majority, independent policy innovation, opposition with alternate proposals, consequential 
opposition, and using in-party presidents to persuade the majority.  However, not all of the 
strategies are available to the minority at any given time.  In fact, in half of the House sessions in 
the study, the minority party had a restricted choice of strategies.  Jones notes that the biggest 
influences on minority party strategy choice are the party unity of both parties, the party of the 
president, the party seat margin, and the strength and influence of party leaders.  Thus, even 
though the minority possesses a wide variety of strategies, it is typically restricted by the political 
setting when making its choice. 
While Jones determines that the goal of the minority is to attain the majority status, all of 
the strategies he presents focus only on policy-making, suggesting that it is through policy that 
the minority makes electoral gains.  However, he does not consider strategies used in the House 
that do not serve policy ends.  I argue that one of the primary strategies the minority party uses 
does not seek to adjust policy outcomes, but cross-pressures majority members into making 
difficult decisions so that the minority can reap electoral gains from majority mistakes. This 
strategy of cross-pressuring does not attempt to directly influence policy outcomes; rather it 
attempts to fortify minority electoral chances by making the majority and its members look bad.  
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Therefore, cross-pressuring does not fit into Jones’ typology of minority strategies, as it is not an 
attempt to directly influence policy, but designed to secure better electoral outcomes for the 
minority and its members.  
Dion (1997) refines the strategic choices of the minority down to two: acquiescence or 
obstruction.  He argues that in any situation, the minority party can simply acquiesce to the 
majority, hoping to receive some sort of legislative concession, or they can obstruct in an attempt 
to prevent the majority from acting at all.  As with Jones (1970), Dion argues that the 
congressional setting dictates minority party strategy.  More specifically, he argues that the 
larger the majority party is, the more likely the minority is to obstruct.  The logic is that large 
majorities are less cohesive (and small minorities are more cohesive) making it is easier for the 
minority to persuade majority members to stall or stop the progress on any given bill.  Dion 
produces both formal and empirical support for his theory; however, his data have a limited 
scope (only looking at points of orders) and ultimately his theory predicts that factors beyond the 
control of the minority (majority party size and cohesion) shape the decisions of the minority.  
While Dion (1994) and Jones (1970) were the first to examine the causes of minority 
party strategies, they were far from being the only ones.  Binder (1996, 1997) shows that 
minority obstruction leads to a restriction of minority party rights in the House.
1
  Rhode (1991) 
and Connelly and Pitney (1994) conduct studies of 1980s and early 1990s Republicans and show 
that younger and more extreme members of the minority party were more likely to obstruct.  
Specifically, Rohde (1991) showed that younger, more extreme Republicans were more likely to 
request votes on the House daily journal, considered to be a ‘pure protest’ procedure.  The logic 
of obstruction holds that minority party members obstruct to either voice discontent with the 
majority or to obstruct the legislative process to the determent of the majority.  However, these 
                                                             
1 See Schickler (2000) for opposing results. 
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reasons become suspect when more recent research shows that rule changes in House that 
occurred in 1890 allow the majority to more or less bypass the will of the minority (Cox and 
McCubbins 2005), the majority has greater agenda control as floor time becomes more scarce 
(Webb Yackee 2003), and that challenges to the daily journal may actually be an organizational 
tool of the majority (Patty 2010).   
Thus, the existing literature on minority party strategies in the House fails to fully and 
properly address minority party behavior for several reasons.  First, it is very limited in scope.  
Jones (1970) address the minority before significant rule changes in the House by both parties in 
the 1970s and 1980s and Dion (1997) fails to address other strategic choice other than 
obstruction and acquiescence.  Second, the existing literature tends to examine minority 
strategies by looking at certain procedures erroneously.  For example, Rohde (1991) claims that 
journal votes are dilatory and protest tactics; while Patty (2010) shows that the majority is 
actually benefitting from journal votes.  Dion determines points of order to be obstruction; 
however, points of order can also server a productive legislative function by ensuring that 
established House procedures are properly followed.  Third, and more importantly, the existing 
literature fails to establish a strategy that the minority can implement regardless of the 
congressional or political setting.  Overall, the literature does not identify any non-situational or 
non-temporal variables that predict or influence the minority’s choice of strategy.  However, I 
argue that the minority does posses a strategy, cross-pressuring, which can be implemented in 
any institutional setting, allowing the minority to actively participate in the legislative process, 
not just simply react to other actors and political institutions. 
Identifying new minority strategies which do not rely on institutional settings is vital to 
not only an academic understanding of the House, but also to democratic theory.  In any 
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democratic legislature there must be a viable minority party with an established set of rights 
(Dion 1997).  While these rights may vary or be restricted, the legislative minority must be able 
to represent the policy positions and desires of national minorities.  However, if the minority 
party in the House and its choices are simply slaves to the institutional setting of Congress then it 
cannot properly represent the will of the minority at large.  Accordingly, if the institutional 
setting is dictating minority strategy then the House may be democratically deficient.  However, 
I argue that this is not the case and that the minority party can implement strategies not reliant on 
institutional settings.  Specifically, I argue that cross-pressuring is a strategy always available to 
the minority party because it is implemented through MTRs, which the minority can always 
request.  In the next section I describe the underlying logic for cross-pressuring and hypotheses 
derived from cross-pressuring.  In addition, I introduce and present the logic of two theories that 
also attempt to explain the minority’s use of MTRs: position-taking and obstruction.  Ultimately, 
the empirical data of this project strongly supports the claims of cross-pressuring.       
Minority Strategies and the Motion to Recommit 
 As noted above, MTRs rarely pass and do not appear to substantively alter policy 
outcomes.  Thus, it is clear that the minority party is not using MTRs to obtain policy victories.  
If immediate policy outcomes are not the goal of MTRs, then why does the minority continue to 
use MTRs and to what end?  Not only does answering this question reveal the legislative ends of 
MTRs, but it also details the logic behind the minority party and how it chooses to operate.  
Based on the findings of Jones (1970) the minority party’s overarching goal is to obtain the 
majority status, thus any strategy the minority uses should directly aide this goal.  Cross-
pressuring does exactly that.  It attempts to either place individual members of the majority in 
precarious situations with their constituents or force them to defect from their party, hurting the 
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majority party label.  Cross-pressuring picks up where the previous literature left off by 
illustrating that the minority party in the House can determine and implement its own strategy, 
even given its very limited rescores, and that the minority is far from inconsequential.    
Cross-pressuring through MTR creates two distinct situations that help the electoral 
chances of the minority.  First, cross-pressuring may result in individual members of the majority 
voting against their constituents and supporting the majority party position, which harm their 
electoral odds.  Second, if majority members defect from their party and support their 
constituency, they make the majority seem less unified, potentially harming the party’s label. 
Cox and McCubbins (1993) show that parties in the House are reliant on their party labels, or 
public impression of the party, for electoral success.  Loyalty allows majority leaders to 
manufacture policy outcomes that create the best party label, which benefits all party members.  
Party loyalty is therefore vital to majority party leaders and they posses many tools to enforce 
party discipline (Cox and McCubbins 1993), especially on procedural votes like MTR
2
 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001).  Thus, cross-pressuring attempts either force majority party members 
to defect from their party, in order to tarnish the majority party’s label, or defect from their 
constituents and face the electoral repercussions. 
Cross-pressuring is possible through MTRs.  Throughout the entire legislative process in 
the House, majority leaders use their agenda control to arrange votes so that the majority’s 
preferred position is pitted against the status quo (Cox and McCubbins 2005).  Therefore, the 
minority’s policy preferences never receive a vote.  However, by using the MTR the minority 
can official present its policy preferences to the chambers and obtain a vote on it preferences 
(Wolfensberger 2007).  In order to cross-pressure, the minority proposes MTRs with instructions 
                                                             
2
 The MTR is almost always considered a procedural vote. The one exception to this is the 110
th
 Congress.  In the 
110th, Speaker Pelosi instructed both party whips and rank-in-file to treat MTR votes as preference votes, not 
procedural votes, allowing majority members more leeway in MTR voting (Peters and Rosenthal 2010). 
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that are more favorable to moderate districts than the majority’s preferred policy stance, which 
could be located anywhere from the chamber median to the majority party median (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993 & 2005; Monroe and Robinson 2008).  The MTR, for the first time in the 
legislative process, forces majority members to choose between different policy option, not just 
the majority’s positions and the status quo.   
Once the MTR is offered, members of the House must vote on the MTR with instructions 
and therefore cast a vote between the policies preferred by more moderate districts and the 
majority’s preference.  This is not a problem for members of either party from extreme districts.  
Majority members from extreme districts that lean towards the majority are not cross-pressured 
because their constituents should overwhelmingly support the majority’s policy position. 
Minority members from extreme districts can easily support the MTR as most of their 
constituents should prefer the MTR over the majority preferred policy.  Minority members from 
moderate likewise find supporting the MTR easy as their district and their party should support 
it.  However, majority members from moderate districts must make a difficult choice: vote 
against either the party, and risk party discipline, or the district, and risk the electoral 
consequences.  Thus, cross-pressuring through MTRs is designed to target majority members 
from moderate districts. 
 The minority targets majority members from moderate districts for several reasons.  First, 
members from moderate districts are at greater electoral risk.  Representatives from moderate 
districts are more likely to attract quality challengers (Bond et al. 1985) and typically receive 
smaller share of the two-party voter (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002).  Since they have a greater risk of 
electoral defeat, they are more prone to listen to their district (Kingdon 1989; Dodd 1977; Arnold 
1990), which means the MTR will have a greater impact on their voting decision because they 
15 
 
must be sensitive to their constituents, who should prefer the MTR.  Furthermore, representatives 
tend to be punished for more extreme voting behavior (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002), so all 
members, particularly those at risk of defeat, are motivated to stay moderate.  
Second, moderate members are more likely to defect from their party. This occurs for 
three reasons.  First, if the minority wrote the instructions properly, moderate members should 
prefer the MTR over the majority’s position, just on face value.  Second, members of Congress 
who are excessively loyal to their party run a greater risk of electoral defeat (Carson et al. 2010).  
Thus, to just simply protect their own electoral chances they may defect from their party.  Third, 
majority party leaders are more likely to allow electorally vulnerable members to defect (Canes-
Wrone et al. 2007; King and Zeckhauser 2003).  However, majority party leaders still want 
protect against policy defeats (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005) and are typically unwilling to let 
all vulnerable members defect at the same time (King and Zeckhauser 2003) or on procedural 
votes (Ansolabehere et al. 2001; Jenkins et al 2005; Snyder and Groseclose 2000).  
 Thus, if cross-pressuring is executed properly, the minority places itself in a win-win 
situation. The MTR with instruction should force moderate majority members to either defect 
from their voters, placing themselves in a precarious electoral position or defect from their party, 
increasing the chances of an immediate policy victory for the minority.  If moderate majority 
members are allowed to defect by the party, they are still causing the party harm by creating a 
less unified party label.  They are publicly making the party look less cohesive and less capable 
of maintaining a governing coalition.  Any damage done to the majority’s party label ultimately 
benefits the minority in the next electoral cycle.  Of these two options, tarnishing the party label 
through MTRs is the least preferable to the minority as the effect on the label is diffused over the 
entire party, thus the damage felt by each member is small.  However, defecting from 
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constituents is preferred as the effect is concentrated on a individual majority member, making it 
easier for the minority sow the electoral benefits. 
Cross-pressuring through MTRs, however, raises concerns about traceability.  Arnold 
(1990) posits that voters only reward or punish members of Congress if their actions are 
traceable, meaning there action in Congress can be directly tied to specific outcomes.  He argues 
that procedural maneuvers and votes are not traceable, and are typically used to disguise 
unfavorable action (Arnold 1990).  MTRs are typically seen as procedural votes and indeed are 
unlikely to be noticed by voters.  This poses a problem for cross-pressuring as a theory, if voters 
do not notice MTR votes then why should members be concerned about defecting from their 
voters on MTR votes?   
The answer to this question is three fold.  First, even if voters do not notice MTR votes, 
active interest groups and other donors will.  Groups focused on the legislation will most 
certainly understand MTRs and their consequences; these groups can then alter contribution or 
alert voters if members do not act accordingly on MTR votes.  Second, future electoral 
challengers will certainly highlight any behavior of the incumbent that goes against the wishes of 
the district.  Again, while MTRs themselves may not be salient to voters, challengers can frame 
voting against MTRs as consistent opposition to the will of the district.  Third, while voter may 
not notice individual procedural votes, they are likely to punish members who are too loyal to the 
party (Carson et al. 2010).  If majority members vote against the MTR, they are inherently 
supporting their party, which is detrimental to their re-election chances.  Thus, even though 
MTRs are a small and technical legislative procedure, several mechanisms exist to punish 
members for not voting correctly on MTRs. 
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 In addition to targeting majority members from moderate districts, cross-pressuring also 
targets extreme legislation.  It is much easier for the minority to cross-pressure moderate 
majority members on extreme legislation, as moderate districts are more likely to oppose 
extreme legislation.  Thus, the minority should offer MTRs on extreme legislation.  Again, the 
purpose is to pit the extreme legislation against a more moderate MTR, which moderate districts 
should prefer, and make majority members choose between the two.  If majority party supported 
legislation is moderate to begin with then moderate majority members will simply support the 
legislation, as they can appease themselves, their district, and their party simultaneously.
3
  Thus, 
there is no need for the minority to offer MTRs on moderate legislation as it does not cross-
pressure.  However, when legislation is extreme, the minority can legitimately cross-pressure 
moderate majority members by offering moderate MTRs.   
The ultimate consequence of cross-pressuring is that the minority party is able to force 
moderated members of the majority party to choose between their voters and their party on more 
extreme pieces of legislation.  If cross-pressing in the fashion predicted above is the motivating 
factor behind MTRs in the House, then three patterns should be observed.  First, the minority 
party should offer MTRs on more extreme legislation.  I test this hypothesis in the following 
chapter and find that this is indeed the case.  Second, support for MTRs among majority party 
members should increase for members from more moderate district and as legislation becomes 
more extreme.  This hypothesis is tested in Chapter 3.  I find support for this hypothesis using a 
data-set comprised of member-bill dyads and conduct an analysis of when majority members 
vote in favor of MTRs.  Third, support for MTR should significantly impact the electoral success 
of majority members from moderate districts.  Cross-pressuring predicts that moderate majority 
                                                             
3 See Cox and McCubbins (2005), Bawn (1998), and Monroe and Robinson (2008) for situations when the majority 
party in the House allows moderate bills to reach the floor. 
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members will have better electoral returns, the more they support MTRs.  Using elections data 
from 1954 – 2008 and an original measure of support for MTRs, I tests this hypothesis in 
Chapter 4 and find support for the effects of cross-pressuring.   
 Cross-pressuring by way of the MTR, reveals several important characteristics about the 
minority party.  First, it shows that the minority party in the House is rational.  It uses the 
resources at its disposal in an efficient manner to achieve its ultimate goal.  Furthermore, the 
minority party is rational in who it cross-pressures.  It seeks moderate members, who are more 
likely to defect from the party and come from moderate or vulnerable districts.  Thus, the 
minority is attacking the majority party label through the very majority members that rely on the 
party label the most.  Second, it shows that the minority party is active.  The minority party is not 
simply a legislative spectator, but an aggressive adversary of the majority.  Using the MTR, the 
minority can consistently cross-pressure the majority, by either forcing majority members to vote 
against their district or tarnishing the majority’s party label, and reap actual benefits from their 
strategy.  Thus, the minority is setting its own strategy, not simply relying on the congressional 
setting to dictate its choices, assuaging any concerns that they are not part of the democratic 
process in the House.  
 Cross-pressuring, however, is not the only existing explanation for the use of MTRs. 
According to the existing literature, there are two other strategies the minority party could be 
pursuing using MTRs: position-taking and obstruction.  Position-taking suggests that the 
minority party uses MTRs to publicly display its policy position.  Wolfensberger (2007) puts 
forth this explanation in his historical account of MTRs.  Specifically, Wolfensberger argues that 
at every other point in the House legislative process, members debate and vote between the status 
quo and the majority’s preferred policy.  It is only with MTRs that the minority party can put 
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forth its own policy position and obtain a vote on that position.  In terms of minority party 
strategies, the minority is using MTRs to fortify its own party label, not attack the majority’s.  
The minority is attempting to let the public know what its preferred position is in order to attract 
more voters. 
 At first glance position-taking may seem similar to cross-pressuring, however, they are 
two separate strategies that approach party labels from different angles.  First, cross-pressuring is 
an aggressive offensive tactic designed to harm the majority’s party label by forcing defection.  
Position-taking is not as aggressive.  It does not attack the majority, just simply hopes to 
highlight the policy differences of the two parties, hoping voters will prefer the minority.  
Second, cross-pressuring can be implemented many more situations than position-taking.  As 
noted above, cross-pressuring can occur any time there are moderate majority members and 
extreme legislation (based on the composition of Congress and the powers of the majority to 
control the agenda, this situation is likely).  However, position-taking can only be used, when the 
issue is salient with constituents or interest groups and when the minority’s stance on the issue is 
preferred by constituents and groups.  If the issue is not salient, there is no need for the minority 
to differentiate itself from the majority, as its efforts will go unnoticed.  Furthermore, if the 
majority’s stance is preferred by the public, then the minority would harm itself by taking the 
other position.  These factors do not occur with cross-pressuring, as the goal is to tarnish the 
majority’s label through party defections or force moderates majority members to vote against 
their constituents, which can be achieved even if the majority’s position is favored.  
 Ultimately if position-taking is the driving force behind MTRs, then MTRs should be 
requested on salient legislation.  Again, the minority gains nothing by taking a position that will 
go unnoticed.  I examine this hypothesis in portions of Chapter 2 and 4.  In both cases, I find that 
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salience fails to predict implementation of or support for MTRs.  Thus, there is little evidence 
supporting position-taking as a prominent minority strategy.  Furthermore, I find that the scant 
evidence for position-taking suggest that the strategy is only benefitting minority party members 
who are already electorally advantaged.  Thus, position-taking as a strategy is not helping the 
minority members who need it most and benefiting those who do not need help. 
 Finally, the minority party may also be using MTRs as a dilatory or obstructionist tactic.  
Simply put, MTRs expend precious floor time.  MTRs with instructions are guaranteed ten 
minutes of floor debate (five each for a proponent and opponent of the MTR), in addition MTRs 
may receive votes, which will also absorb floor time.  Thus, the minority could use MTRs to 
delay legislative proceeding, preventing the majority from being able to implement its full 
legislative agenda.  Through wasting floor time, the minority is able to obstruct the minority 
from fulfilling its legislative obligation, causing the majority electoral troubles.  However, as 
noted above, this is unlikely to happen in the House, as the majority possesses rules and 
procedures that allow it set the agenda in its favor, procuring legislation ideal to the majority 
(Cox and McCubbins 2005). 
 If obstruction is the driving force behind MTRs then MTRs should significantly and 
substantively increase the time it takes to pass legislation.  Based on House rules, MTRs should 
increase the time it takes to pass legislation, however, the increase may not be substantive as the 
majority can simply work the potential for MTRs into its time allotment for each bill.  I evaluate 
the obstructive capabilities of MTRs in Chapter 4.  Using duration models of the time it takes to 
pass a bill, I find that MTRs significantly increase passage time but the substantive impact is 
rather low.  Overall, I find little support for obstructionism. 
21 
 
 This project unfolds in the following manner.  In Chapter 2 I address MTRs and 
individual pieces of legislation.  Specifically, I attempt to determine which legislation is more 
likely to receive a request for an MTR with instructions.  I examine both cross-pressuring and 
position-taking using an original dataset composed of all contentious pieces of legislation in the 
House from the 101
st
 to the 110
th
 Congress.  I find that extreme legislation is more likely to 
receive an MTR, while saliency does not significantly impact the use of MTRs.  Thus, Chapter 2 
provides evidence for cross-pressuring. 
 Chapter 3 examines support for MTRs among members of the majority party.  If MTRs 
are being used for cross-pressuring, then more moderate majority members should support 
MTRs on more extreme legislation.  To test this hypothesis, I created a dataset composed of 
member-bill dyads.  This large and original dataset is comprised of the votes for every MTR by 
each member of the majority part from the 103
rd
 to the 110
th
 House.  The empirical evidence 
reveals that majority members are more supportive on MTRs when their constituent’s 
partisanship is moderate and the legislation is extreme, supporting the underlying logic of cross-
pressuring.  I then conclude the project with a discussion on the impact and implications of 
cross-pressuring and where future research can pick up. 
Chapter 4 examines the effects of MTRs.  Specifically, it tests the outcomes of cross-
pressuring and obstruction.  I examine two hypotheses in Chapter 4, whether MTRs actually 
possess the capability to substantively delay legislative proceedings and whether supporting 
MTRs actually increase the electoral success of moderate majority members.  Using the same 
dataset from Chapter 2, I conduct Cox Proportional Hazard duration model to determine if MTRs 
impact the length of time it takes to pass legislation.  I find that MTRs significantly increase the 
passage time of legislation, implying that MTRs due obstruct the legislative process.  However, I 
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also find support for cross-pressuring in that support for MTRs does lead to better electoral 
outcomes for moderate majority members, just as cross-pressuring predicts. 
 This project puts forth an original and innovative theory of minority party strategy in the 
House.  I argue that cross-pressuring is the one strategy that the minority can consistently use, 
regardless of the institutional setting, because it is implemented through the MTR.  Not only is 
cross-pressuring always available to the minority party, of the available strategies, it is the 
strategy best suited to help the minority achieve its ultimate goal, taking over the majority status.  
The following chapters show that empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports cross-pressuring 
as the primary motivation of MTRs, and thus, the dominate minority party strategy in the House.  
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Chapter 2 
Which Legislation Receives Motions to Recommit? 
 In the previous chapter, I laid out three theories regarding why the minority party in the 
House uses the motion to recommit, cross-pressuring, position-taking, and obstruction.  These 
three theories make specific claims about why the minority uses MTRs and thus what strategy 
the minority chooses to use in a majority dominated environment.  To further understand these 
theories and the actions of the minority I examine when the minority party offers MTRs on 
legislation.  Through this chapter I look at the characteristics of legislation, as well as the House 
itself, to determine which situations lead the minority to request MTRs.  I test these predictions 
to determine which theory best explains the minority’s use of the motion to recommit and 
ultimately, understanding how the minority uses MTRs will reveal the overarching strategy of 
the minority party.  
Requesting MTRs 
 The first academic account of why and when the minority party requests MTRs is 
Krehbiel and Meirowitz (2002).  Using a formal model, they argue that MTRs are used by the 
minority to produce policy outcomes that match the preferences of the House median member.  
A direct prediction of Krehbiel and Meirowitz’s model is that the minority should request an 
MTR on every piece of legislation (Roberts 2005).  However, empirical tests show that this is 
simply not the case; MTRs are only requested on approximately thirty percent of legislation 
(Roberts 2005; Cox et al. 2007; Lynch 2008; Clark 2012).
4
  These findings indicate that MTRs 
are not used to procure median policy outcomes and that there is something else explaining MTR 
requests.  However, the authors that criticize Krehbiel and Meirowitz, do not produce their own 
                                                             
4 The data I collected for this chapter comport with these findings.  See Table 2.1. 
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theories of MTR requests, other than simply showing how MTRs do not violated the logic of 
partisan theories of the House. 
 Wolfensberger (2007) picks up where Krehbiel and Meirowitz left off and theorizes, 
based on years of working with Republicans in the House, that the minority party uses MTRs to 
obtain votes on their preferred policy position.  He argues that every other procedure in the 
House is exploited by the majority to prevent a vote on the minority’s position.  However, the 
minority can in turn exploit the MTR to force a vote and establish its position.  Wolfensberger 
argues that the minority is more reliant on MTRs when the majority is using restrictive rules.  
Under restrictive rules, it becomes difficult for the minority to even offer amendments, thus the 
MTR is literally the only opportunity for the minority to make its position known.  Using this 
logic, MTR requests should be more likely under restrictive rules.  Simply put, under open rules, 
the minority can use other means (amendments) to establish its position.  Under restrictive rules, 
the minority must rely on MTRs. 
 Wolfensberger, however, neglects to describe what the minority gains from forcing votes 
on its policy position.  This is where my theory of cross-pressuring comes into play.  I pick up 
where Wolfensberger left off and argue that the reason the minority forces votes is not merely for 
position-taking purposes, but to force moderate majority members into difficult votes.  By using 
MTRs to establish a more moderate policy alternative to the majority’s position, the minority 
forces majority members to either vote with their party or for the MTR.  This should cross-
pressure majority members from moderate districts because the district prefers the more 
moderate MTR and party leaders have a plethora of tools (see Cox and McCubbins 1993 and 
Sinclair 1997) to punish members who do not vote in line with the party.  Ultimately, by cross-
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pressuring the minority hopes to make majority members vote against their districts and reap the 
electoral benefits in the next election.   
 Position-taking, as proscribed by Wolfensberger (2007), and cross-pressuring share a 
similar foundation, and as such make a similar prediction about when the minority requests 
MTRs.  According to both theories, the minority is more likely to offer MTRs on bills with 
restrictive rules.  While each theory makes this prediction, they follow different sets of logic to 
arrive at this predication.  As noted above, when a bill is under a restrictive rule, the MTR is the 
only option available to take a position.  For cross-pressuring, the minority is more likely to 
request MTRs on bills with restrictive rules because it makes cross-pressuring easier, because 
majority members have no other opportunity to offer amendments their constituents may like.  
Under restrictive rules, it is difficult if not impossible for any House member to offer an 
amendment.  The minority takes advantage of this by crafting a moderate MTR and force a vote 
between the moderate MTR and the majority’s bill.  If executed properly, MTRs should cross-
pressure moderate majority members because they must choose between the district’s desires or 
the party’s discipline, and they have none of the options available under an open rule.  Thus, both 
theories arrive at the following hypothesis: 
 Restrictive Rules hypothesis: The minority party is more likely to request motions to 
recommit on bills which come to the floor under closed and restrictive rules than those which 
have open rules. 
  The similarities between cross-pressuring and position-taking end here.  While both 
theories make the same prediction regarding restrictive rules, they deviate from each other on 
several other predictions. I now walk through the remaining logic of each theory revolving 
around MTR requests and arrive at specific predictions for each. 
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Cross-Pressuring and MTR Requests 
 In order to truly cross-pressure moderate majority members, MTRs with instructions 
must be more appealing to policy moderate than the legislation.  The minority can more easily 
accomplish this task when the legislation in question is extreme.  If the legislation itself is 
moderate, then moderate MTRs do not cross-pressure anyone.  Therefore, in order to properly 
cross-pressure its intended targets, the minority must requests MTRs on more extreme bills.  In 
this situation, MTRs are able to cross-pressure because moderate districts should prefer the 
MTR, while the majority party uses its powers to whip procedural votes (Ansolabehere et al. 
2001; Jenkins et al 2005; Snyder and Groseclose 2000).  Cross-pressuring predicts the following 
hypothesis: 
 Extremity hypothesis: The minority party is more likely to request motions to recommit 
on bills with extreme ideological positions. 
Position-taking and MTR Requests 
The idea of position-taking was introduced by Mayhew (1974).  According to Mayhew, 
position-taking is one of the three behaviors members of Congress use to get re-elected.  More 
specifically, members discover the policy preferences of their constituents and make public 
stances that match constituents (Mayhew 1974).  In fact, Mayhew goes as far to say that recorded 
roll call votes at floor speeches are tools for members of Congress to take popular stands, not 
change policy.  Thus, position-taking is an electoral strategy; however, it differs from cross-
pressuring in that it attempts to differentiate the minority’s position from the majority.  It is not 
attacking majority members, like cross-pressuring, but trying to make the minority seem more 
appealing to voters.  Mayhew is clear in his description of position-taking that members find 
popular issue to take a position.  Likewise, if the minority is using MTRs for position-taking in 
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the purest Mayhewian sense it should be requesting MTRs with instructions on salient issues.  
There is no need for the minority to take a position of issues voters do not care about.  Thus, it 
selects issues important to voters to establish its position through MTR with instructions.   
Furthermore, if position-taking is the driving force behind MTRs, then the minority 
should not be too concerned with the ideological position of the legislation.  It simply needs to 
differentiate itself from the majority on salient issues, not necessarily issues where the majority 
has an extreme stance.  An extreme majority stance may allow the minority to increase the 
perceived distance between the parties, but it still must seek salient issues.  Regardless of the 
bills ideological position, the minority seeks bills people are paying attention to in order to 
position-take. This makes saliency, not ideology, the main predictor for position-taking. This 
logic results in the following hypothesis: 
 Saliency hypothesis: The minority party is more likely to request motions to recommit on 
salient bills. 
 As mentioned above, the rules governing a bill impact whether the minority requests an 
MTR.  Both Position-taking and cross-pressuring predict that bills with restrictive rules are more 
likely to receive MTR requests. Because both theories are grounded in the idea that the minority 
party uses MTRs to communicate with voters, both theories predict that the relationship should 
become even stronger when legislation is salient.  The minority is more motivated to take a 
position on salient issues and has fewer opportunities to do so under restrictive rules.  Thus, 
position-taking predicts that MTRs should be requested on salient bills with restrictive rules. 
 Saliency/Restrictive Rules hypothesis: The minority party is more likely to request 
motions to recommit on salient bills that receive restrictive rules. 
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Obstruction and MTR Requests: 
 In addition to cross-pressuring and position-taking, a third theory makes predications 
about MTR requests.  Specifically, members of Congress believe the minority can use MTRs as 
a dilatory tactic (Lynch 2008).  According to the standing rules of the House, MTRs are granted 
ten minutes of floor debate, thus the minority uses MTRs to obstruct the House process in order 
to either prevent the majority from executing its agenda, or obtain some sort of legislative 
concession from the majority.  Much of the literature examining minority obstruction treats it as 
an independent variable (Binder 1996 & 1997: Schickler 2000), however, Dion (1997) treats 
obstruction as the dependent variable.  Dion argues that the minority is more likely to obstruct 
when the majority party coalition less cohesive. Lack of cohesion makes it easier for the minority 
to obstruct because the majority does not have the required cohesion to prevent it.  Dion finds 
support for his theory by looking at points of orders, which he shows to be dilatory tactics.  Thus, 
if the MTR is likewise a dilatory tactic then the minority should be requesting them when the 
majority is incohesive.  Thus, the standing theory of obstruction predicts one hypothesis dealing 
with MTR requests: 
 Obstruction hypothesis:  The minority party requests more motions to recommit when the 
majority party is less cohesive. 
Data and Methods 
 To test the hypotheses predicted in this chapter I created a database of legislation in the 
House from the 101
st
 to the 110
th
 Congress.  Specifically, I collect data on any bill receiving a 
rule in the House.
5
  Practically, MTRs are not offered on bills that do not receive rules, so in 
order to accurately test which bills get MTR requests, I only consider bills that actually have a 
                                                             
5
 I exclude any bill considered and passed under suspension of the rules or unanimous consent.  Bills or resolutions 
that were considered privileged and not unanimously passed were included in the data set, while legislation 
considered privileged and passed unanimously were excluded. 
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chance of getting an MTR request.  The dataset contains all types of House bills and resolutions 
and several types of Senate bills and resolutions.
6
  In addition, the data set also includes 
conference reports on any bill or resolution that received a rule.  The data set covers all situations 
in which MTRs realistically be requested.  Thus, in the dataset, the unit of analysis is the floor 
action and not the legislation itself, as any given piece of legislation might receive an MTR 
during original House consideration or as a conference report.  Over the time frame of the 
dataset, 2013 bills and resolutions received rules. Table 2.1 provides a descriptive table of the 
number of bills and resolution per congress received a rule and how many received an MTR 
request and what type of request. 
 The dependent variable in the analysis is a dummy variable that when the House 
considered the piece of legislation, the minority party offered an MTR with instructions.  I do not 
include straight MTRs as the lack of instructions prevents any cross-pressuring or position-taking 
from occurring.  In addition, as Table 2.1 indicates, straight MTRs make up a small percent of 
the actual MTRs offered.  In the dataset, 594 floor actions received an MTR with instructions, 
while only 71 bills received straight MTRs.  This data was collected by reviewing the legislative 
history for all the bills in the dataset on Thomas and were verified using an exhaustive list of 
MTRs from Lynch (2008).     
The first statistical analysis I conduct tests the hypotheses dealing with cross-pressuring 
and position-taking.  In this test, I use three key independent variables.  The first is the DW-
NOMINATE score of the legislation’s sponsor.  I use this measure as a proxy for the ideological  
  
                                                             
6 Specifically, the dataset includes House Concurrent Resolutions, House Joint Resolutions, House Resolutions, 
House Bills, Senate Bills, Senate Concurrent Resolutions, and Senate Joint Resolutions. 
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Table 2.1 Legislation with Rules and MTR Requests by Congress 
  
 Legislation         Straight              MTRs    Total  
Congress  with Rules          MTRs      with Instructions    MTRs 
101st       203     9 (4.43%)    28 (13.79%) 37 (18.23%) 
102nd       241     20 (8.29%)    48 (19.91%)     68 (28.22%) 
103rd       189     14 (7.41%)    53 (28.04%) 67 (35.44%) 
104th       222     10 (4.50%)    71 (31.98%) 81 (36.48%) 
105th       215       6 (2.39%)   43 (20.00%) 49 (22.79%) 
106th       240       5 (2.08%)  48 (20.00%) 53 (22.08%) 
107th       161       0 (0.00%)    49 (30.43%) 49 (30.43%) 
108th       193       3 (1.55%)    65 (33.67%) 68 (35.23%) 
109th       162       3 (1.85%)  59 (36.42%) 62 (38.27%) 
110th       187       1 (0.53%)        130 (69.52%)            131 (70.05%) 
Total     2013     71 (3.52%)        594 (29.51%)            665 (33.03%) 
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location of the floor action.
7
  During the time-frame of the dataset, the party control of the 
majority switches twice (from the Democrats to the Republicans in the 104
th
 Congress and from 
the Republicans to the Democrats in 110
th
 Congress).  To compensate for these changes, I adjust 
the NOMINATE scores so that a 1 always represents an extreme majority position.  Typically, 
NOMINATE runs from -1 to 1 with a -1 indicating a strong liberal.  However, with the 
adjustment, a 1 is always pointing in the direction on the majority.
8
  With this adjustment, I 
expect that a positive and significant relationship between an action receiving an MTR and the 
sponsor’s ideology.  This indicates that the more extreme legislation is, on the majority’s side, 
the more likely it is to receive and MTR.  This variable is just to test extremity hypothesis, I 
expect a positive and significant relationship with the probability of offering and MTR.   
 The second key independent variable is a measure of salience.  This variable is used to 
test the implication of minority party position-taking.  To calculate the salience, I conducted 
LexisNexis search of the New York Times for each floor action in the dataset.  Specifically, I set 
the date of the search to the two year time period for the respective session of Congress, and then 
searched both the bill or resolutions number and its short title.  I then recorded the number of hits 
returned for both the number and title added the two together.  The mean salience is 1.2 with a 
standard deviation of 11.14, the mode is 0.  To support the saliency hypothesis, salience should 
be positive and significant in the model. 
 The third key independent variable is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a 
restrictive rule.  Rules a typically classified as open (allowing any amendment), modified 
(allowing only certain amendments), or closed (allowing no amendments).  Any floor action with 
                                                             
7 I choose this measure over the floor action’s NOMINATE cutpoint because cutpoints can only be obtained if the 
floor action received a roll call vote.  Thus, I lose approximately 200 observations (a large portion of the resolutions) 
if we use cutpoints.   
8 Since Republicans tend to be on the positive side of the NOMINATE scale, I simply multiplied all DW-
NOMINATE scores by -1 for years in which the Democrats controlled the House. 
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a modified or closed rule is measured as restrictive.  I use this variable to test the restrictive rules 
hypothesis.  Ultimately, both the cross-pressuring theory and the position-taking theory predict 
that the restrictive rules variable should be positive and significant.   
 In addition, I implement several control variables into the model.  The first is a control 
for the complexity of the floor action.  I calculate this measure by counting the number of words 
for each bill or resolution then take the natural log of the word count.  I use a dichotomous 
variable to control for appropriations bills.  Appropriations bills go through a different process 
than non-appropriation bills, this variable controls for this variation.  I also control for the 
number of cosponsors for each action, which was simply taken from the Congressional Bills 
Project (CBP) (1989-2008) and supplemented with Thomas.  I also insert a dichotomous variable 
for conference reports, noting that while conference reports are subject to MTRs (with or without 
instructions) they are substantively different from pre-conference legislation.  Finally, I 
implement fixed effects for each congressional session.  I use a logit regression to test the 
hypotheses.  Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics and sources of all of the variables used in 
the logit models. 
Cross-Pressuring and Position-Taking Results: 
 Table 2.3 reports the results of three separate logit models.  The first model looks at all of 
the floor actions in the dataset.  The second only examines floor actions with restrictive rules and 
the third only tests floor actions with open rules.  This was done to test the saliency/restrictive 
rules hypothesis and to see if the minority adjusts its behavior when different rules are in play. 
 In the model examining all floor actions both the restrictive rules hypothesis and the 
extremity hypothesis receive support.  First, the independent variable sponsor ideology is positive 
and significant.  This indicates that the further a bill or resolution is to the majority’s side of the  
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Floor Action Data 
 
Variable   Mean Standard Deviation Min     Max Source   
MTR with Instructions   0.289  0.453                 0       1     Thomas/Lynch (2008) 
 
Sponsor Ideology 0.394 0.225           -0.704       0.973 Vote View 
 
Salience 1.263 11.14 0           239 New York Times 
 
Log of Word Count 8.485 1.838 2         12.86 Thomas 
 
Restrictive Rules 0.595 0.91 0 1 Thomas 
 
Salience*Restrictive .994 9.29 0 231 Thomas/NYT 
 
Appropriations Bill 0.315 0.465 0 1 Thomas 
 
Number of Cosponsors 23.50 47.80 0           315 CBP/Thomas 
 
Conference Report       0.193           0.394          0             1 Thomas   
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Table 2.3 Probability of a Piece of Legislation Receiving a Motion to Recommit 
  
 
All 
Legislation 
  
Restrictive 
Rules 
  
Open 
Rules 
 Adjusted Sponsor DW-NOMINATE 
 
0.74** 
  
0.53 
  
1.28* 
 
  
(0.29) 
  
(0.36) 
  
(0.60) 
 Salience 
 
0.01 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
 Restrictive Rule 
 
1.05*** 
  
-- 
  
-- 
 
  
(0.13) 
  
-- 
  
-- 
 Log of Word Count 
 
0.23*** 
  
0.17*** 
  
0.45*** 
 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.08) 
 Appropriations Bill 
 
-0.03 
  
-0.18 
  
-0.03 
 
  
(0.14) 
  
(0.17) 
  
(0.25) 
 Number of Cosponsors 
 
0.00*** 
  
0.00*** 
  
0.00 
 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
 Conference Report 
 
-1.33*** 
  
-1.32*** 
  
-0.75 
 
  
(0.18) 
  
(0.19) 
  
(0.39) 
 Constant 
 
-4.52*** 
  
-2.96*** 
  
-6.44*** 
 
  
(0.41) 
  
(0.49) 
  
(0.85) 
 N 
 
2003 
  
1192 
  
811 
 Pseudo R2 
 
0.164 
  
0.138 
  
0.118 
 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by floor action.  Fixed effects for congressional sessions 
are not reported.  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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ideological spectrum (or more precisely, the further the sponsor is in that direction), the more 
likely the minority party is to offer a motion to recommit.  This relationship is seen more clearly 
in Figure 2.1, which displays the predicted probabilities of the minority offering an MTR in 
relation to the ideology of the bill’s sponsor.9 The solid line indicates the predicted probability 
and the dashed lines the 95% confidence interval. Over the full range of the variable, as the 
sponsor moves from most moderate (-0.2, or slightly on the minority side of the ideological 
spectrum) to most extreme (0.8), the probability of observing a motion to recommit goes from 
slightly less than .18 to approximately .30.  Thus, not only is the influence of sponsor ideology 
significant but substantive as well.   
 Next, the restrictive rules dummy is positive and significant, indicating that the minority 
is more likely to offer the motion to recommit when they are least able to use the amending 
process, indicating that when the minority cannot use amendments to cross-pressure or position-
take, it relies on MTRs.  This comports with the bivariate relationship between rule type and 
motion to recommit:  in practice the minority party offers the motion to recommit on 18% of all 
open rule bills, and 38%, of all restrictive rule bills.  This finding supports the restrictive rules 
hypothesis, a prediction made by both cross-pressuring and position-taking. 
 While position-taking is supported by the restrictive rules dummy, it is not supported by 
the salience variable, which is insignificant, indicating that minority is not relying on the public’s 
interest or knowledge on a bill when offering MTRs.  This finding is a large blow for position-
taking.  Furthermore, the restrictive rules model indicates that salience is not a significant 
predictor of MTR even on restricted floor actions.  Thus, even on the floor actions where,  
  
                                                             
9 Predicted probabilities are obtained using CLARIFY (Tomz et al 2001), with all variables other than sponsor 
ideology set to their median values.  
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NOTE:  Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval 
Figure 2.1 Bill Sponsor Ideology and Motion to Recommit Requests, All Bills 
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according to position-taking, salience should matter the most, it is insignificant.  Therefore, it 
does not appear that the minority is offering MTRs as a means of position-taking. 
 In addition, a more nuanced story of cross-pressuring appears when the restrictive rules 
and open rules models are taken into account. The results indicate that the effect of sponsor 
ideology is limited to bills brought to the floor under open rules.  Thus it appears that the 
minority party does not consider bill/sponsor ideology in its decision-making calculus when 
there is a closed rule, using the rule as a proxy for extremity and majority protection.  However, 
when the minority is able to offer amendments, sponsor ideology does induce the minority to 
offer the motion to recommit - indeed, this appears to be one of the only factors, given the 
paucity of significant control variables in open rules model.  Figure 2.2 displays the predicted 
relationship between sponsor ideology and the probability of the minority offering the motion to 
recommit when there is an open rule.  The solid line indicates the predicted probability and the 
dashed lines the 95% confidence interval.  Over the full range of the variable, as the sponsor 
moves from most moderate (-0.2, or slightly on the minority side of the ideological spectrum) to 
most extreme (0.8), the probability of observing a motion to recommit more than doubles. This 
finding supports the cross-pressuring hypothesis 3, that on open rules the minority offers MTRs 
on more extreme legislation.  
 After the first analysis, all three cross-pressuring hypotheses are supported, while only 
one position-taking hypothesis is supported.  Furthermore, the only position-taking hypothesis 
supported is the one it shares with cross-pressuring.  This leaves cross-pressuring in very good 
standing, while the footing of position-taking is rather shaky.  This first analysis strongly 
indicates that cross-pressuring is the driving force behind MTRs, not position-taking.  However, 
the obstruction hypotheses must be tested before any hard conclusions are made.   
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NOTE:  Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval 
Figure 2.2 Bill Sponsor Ideology and Motion to Recommit Requests, Bills with Open Rules 
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Obstruction Results 
 As noted above, previous research on obstruction indicates that the minority is more 
likely to obstruct when the majority party is less cohesive (Dion 1997).  Table 2.4 provides 
summary statistics of each session of congress used in the dataset.  The first column, the percent 
of bills receiving MTRs, is taken directly from Table 2.1.  In addition, I include another statistic, 
the majority party cohesion.  The party unity measure is taken from voteview.com, which 
calculates the proportion of members from each party that voted with their party, when a 
majority of each party voted in opposition of each other (McCarty et al. 2006).  If MTRs are used 
as obstruction, then, following Dion’s logic, the minority should offer more MTRs when the 
majority is incohesive.  
 Table 2.4 suggests no connection between majority seat share or cohesion and the 
frequency of MTR requests.  For example the 110
th
 House had both the highest raw number of 
MTRs and the highest percentage of MTRs offered.  However, it is ranked fourth highest in 
majority party cohesion.  If MTRs were being implemented as obstruction, the 110
th
 would be 
expected to have the lowest cohesion, but that is simply not the case.  This is seem more clearly 
in Figure 2.3, which presents the lowess curve of majority party cohesion and the percent of floor 
actions that received MTR for each congress.  Judging from Figure 2.3, there is not apparent 
relationship between cohesion and MTR offers.  Furthermore, majority cohesion and MTR offers 
are correlated at .32, a rather weak but positive relationship.  The direction of the correlation 
works against the hypothesis as the hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between the two 
variables.   Ultimately, there is no apparent relationship between MTR offering rate and majority 
seat share and cohesion.  These findings do not provide support for either of the obstruction 
hypothesis and imply that obstruction is not the motivation for MTRs. 
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Table 2.4 MTRs Offered and Majority Coalition Size and Cohesion 
 
Congress 
 Percent of Bills 
Receiving MTRs 
Majority Party 
Cohesion 
101st 
 
37 (18.23%) 87.96% 
102nd 
 
67 (28.22%) 86.15% 
103rd 
 
66 (35.44%) 86.03% 
104th 
 
77 (36.48%) 87.21% 
105th 
 
49 (22.79%) 91.81% 
106th 
 
51 (22.08%) 89.56% 
107th 
 
48 (30.43%) 89.34% 
108th 
 
66 (35.23%) 93.39% 
109th 
 
61 (38.27%) 93.71% 
110th 
 
130 (70.05%) 90.45% 
Note: Majority seat share calculated at the start of the session.  Party cohesion scores were taken from 
voteview.com. 
 
 
  
41 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Lowess Curve of MTRs and Majority Cohesion 
  
42 
 
Conclusion: 
 Throughout this chapter, five different hypotheses were presented and tested.  In the end, 
only two received support, the two specifically dealing with cross-pressuring.  The only support 
position-taking received is the hypothesis it shares with cross-pressuring.  This indicates strong 
support for my theory of cross-pressuring.  More specifically, in determining when to offer an 
MTR, the minority party seems more likely to base their calculations on the variables and 
relationships predicted by cross-pressuring.  When all legislation is considered, the minority uses 
the ideological extremity of the bill and the restrictiveness of the rule to determine whether to 
offer an MTR.  When legislation is brought to the floor under an open rule, then ideological 
extremity of the bill influences the decision.  All of which support the predictions of cross-
pressuring. 
Furthermore, the results of this chapter strike a strong blow to theories of position-taking 
and obstruction.  Salience is not driving minority MTRs requests, regardless of the rule on the 
bill. Thus, there is no evidence that the minority is concerned with the public position of MTRs, 
indicating that it is not using MTRs to differentiate itself from the majority.  In addition, existing 
theories of obstruction fail to empirically predict the aggregate use of MTRs, implying that 
obstruction is not the driving force behind minority MTR use.  Ultimately, the tests conducted in 
this chapter provide a great deal of support for cross-pressuring, while providing little for the 
other existing theories of MTR use.  
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Chapter 3 
Who Supports Motions to Recommit? 
 Members of Congress cast many votes throughout each congressional session.  These 
votes range from mundane procedural and committee votes to final passage votes that directly 
shape American law.  Members are influenced by a variety of factors when determining how to 
vote, including constituents (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1989) and parties (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993 & 2005; Sinclair 1997; Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 2000).  
Building on established knowledge about members’ voting behavior, the theories discussed at 
length in this project make predictions about when members of Congress vote for MTRs.  More 
specifically, cross-pressuring and position-taking make explicit claims regarding who should 
support MTRs and when they should be supportive.  Testing these claims leads to a more 
complete understanding of minority strategy, particularly regarding the use of MTRs.   
How Members of Congress Vote  
 One of the cornerstones of the congressional literature is that members of Congress desire 
to be re-elected (Mayhew 1974). As such, members alter much of their behavior, whether it be in 
committee (Fenno 1973; Deering and Smith 1997), in the district (Fenno 1974), or on the floor 
(Mayhew 1974; Kingdon 1989), to obtain re-election.  In particular, members follow the desires 
of constituents when making voting decisions, particularly if the issue is salient to voters 
(Kingdon 1989).  In addition, members are concerned that any negative traceable action could 
eventually come to light, even to constituents not currently paying attention, and cause electoral 
damage (Arnold 1990).  This fear is further cemented by the fact that attentive constituents 
(opinion leaders, interest groups, challengers) keep track of votes and notify the larger 
constituency of any missteps by the member of Congress (Arnold 1990; Bovitz and Carson 
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2006).   Thus, members of Congress must take into account the preferences of constituents when 
making voting decisions. 
 However, as much as members seek to please their constituents, other factors often make 
it difficult. In both chambers of Congress (Roberts and Cohen Bell 2008; Gailmard and Jenkins 
2007), but particularly the House (Cox and McCubbins 1993 & 2005; Aldrich 1995; Rohde 
1991; Aldrich and Rohde 2000), party leaders posses several sticks and carrots to influence the 
voting behavior of members.  These sticks and carrots include committee assignments, campaign 
funding, legislative assistance, and pork (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Carroll and Kim 2010; 
Monroe and Jenkins Forthcoming).  While both parties in the House possess tools to control their 
own rank-and-file, the majority increases its power by controlling the legislative agenda.  The 
majority gains this agenda control through its grip on House procedures. 
The majority typically whips procedural votes much harder than passage votes 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001; Jenkins et al 2005; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; Sinclair 2002; 
Marshall 2003; Cox and Poole 2002). It is procedures that grant the majority its legislative 
dominance in the House (Cox and McCubbins 2005), thus majority leaders are typically 
unwilling to allow defections on procedural votes.  More specifically, majority party leaders tend 
to treat MTR votes as procedural votes and as such, whip them rather heavily (Roberts 2005; 
Lynch 2008, Peters and Rosenthal 2010).  Therefore, majority members feel pressure from their 
leadership to vote against MTRs and support the legislation. 
 Thus, members' votes are legitimately pressured by both their constituents and their 
party.  Constituents can punish members at the polls for any perceived mis-votes.  Meanwhile, 
party leaders can use their tools to punish members for any party defection (Cox and McCubbins 
1993).  When the party and constituents share preferences, members have easy voting decisions 
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to make; however, when the preferences of the party and constituents diverge, members must 
choose one, typically selecting the option that produces the least amount of damage (Kingdon 
1989).  When the minority party introduces an MTR, it strategically places majority members in 
a predicament where they must choose between their constituents or their party.  The minority 
knows that either choice can harm majority members.  I now examine which members vote in 
support of MTRs and when they do so, according to cross-pressuring. 
MTR Votes and Cross-Pressuring 
 To begin, cross-pressuring, while a minority strategy, is designed to alter the choices of 
majority party members.  As such, cross-pressuring does not make any prediction about minority 
member regarding MTR support.  As such, the discussion in this section refers to the incentives 
and actions of majority party members, unless otherwise indicated.   
 According to the literature, several factors come into play when majority members vote: 
constituency preferences, saliency, and party preferences. Thus, each of these factors must be 
addressed in determining how members vote on MTRs. Members often face strong pressure from 
the leadership to vote with the party on motions to recommit.  The party leadership whips these 
votes hard, since a loss can result in the majority temporarily losing control over the floor agenda 
(Wolfensberger 2007).  This places votes on the motion to recommit in the same category as 
voting on the previous question on special rules (Finocciaro and Rohde 2008) and other 
procedural votes (Sinclair 2002, Jenkins et al 2005) which the majority leadership whips harder 
than ordinary final passage votes.  As described most thoroughly by Cox and McCubbins (1993), 
the majority procedural coalition is held together primarily by exercising party unity on votes 
which determine the floor agenda; in most Congresses, majority leaders include votes on 
adopting the motions to recommit among these (Wolfensberger 2007; Peters and Rosenthal 
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2010). Thus, members of the majority party face significant party pressure to toe the line on 
MTR votes.  
 Constituency influence on MTR votes is dictated by several factors.  First, the ideological 
disposition of the district impacts majority members voting decisions.  In order to please their 
constituents, members must create voting patterns that match the ideological position of their 
district (Arnold 1990).  Next, the ideological positions of both the legislation and the instructions 
on the MTR influence whether majority members support MTRs.  According to cross-pressuring, 
the MTRs are crafted to be attractive to policy moderates.  In addition, the previous chapter 
showed that MTRs are much more likely to be offered on extreme legislation.  Thus, if cross-
pressuring is executed properly, the instructions included in the MTR should be moderate and 
the legislation extreme.  This leads to the first three predictions of cross-pressuring and MTR 
support. 
 Moderate Districts Hypothesis:  Majority party members are more likely vote aye on 
MTRs the more moderate their district is.  Since cross-pressuring predicts the MTR is moderate, 
then more moderate districts should prefer the MTR over more extreme majority bill.  Thus, the 
more moderate the district, the more likely a majority members is to defect from the party and 
support an MTR. 
 Extreme Legislation Hypothesis: Majority party members are more likely vote aye on 
MTRs the more extreme the legislation is.  The more extreme the legislation is, the more likely 
policy moderates will prefer the MTR.  Thus, those majority members who must placate policy 
moderates are more likely to support MTRs when the legislation is extreme. 
 District/Legislation Hypothesis: Majority party members are more likely vote aye on 
MTRs the more moderate there district is and the more extreme the legislation is.  When 
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majority members come from a moderate district and the legislation is extreme, the more 
moderate MTR will be a much more appealing option to voters.  Thus, majority members are 
more likely to support MTRs in this situation. 
 There is one more factor to consider.  Constituency influences typically hinge on 
saliency.  The more salient an issue is, the more influence constituents have on members’ vote 
choices (Kingdon 1989).  Thus, on salient issues, the three previous relationships should be more 
pronounced.  This reveals a subsequent hypothesis. 
 Saliency Hypothesis: the impact of moderate districts, extreme legislation, and the 
combination of the two, should be stronger when the legislation being considered is salient.   
 The saliency hypothesis begs the question, do members of Congress feel that voters 
notice and punish them for MTR votes?  The answer to this question appears to be yes, 
particularly on more salient issues.  Several media accounts on MTR votes cite concerns from 
majority members about how their MTR votes are perceived by voters.  For example, majority 
members were very much concerned about their vote on an MTR on the 2010 healthcare reform 
legislation, which contained language similar to the Stupak-Pitts amendment which prohibited 
federal funds from covering abortion.  The Stupak-Pitts amendment originally passed the House, 
with the support of several moderate Democrats, but was dropped from the legislation in the 
conference committee.  When the conference report returned to the House, many Democrats, 
particularly those from moderate districts, threatened to not vote for the bill fearing the electoral 
repercussions of passing the bill without Stupak-Pitts.  To ease fears, President Obama issued an 
executive order to accomplish the same task as the amendment.  However, despite the executive 
order, the Republican minority introduced an MTR with very similar language as Stupak-Pitts, 
basically forcing members to choose between the House bill containing the amendment and the 
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Senate which excluded the amendment.   In discussing the MTR, Bart Stupak himself said that 
members of the Democratic majority were “concerned about [the MTR],” that voting against it 
may frame them as ‘flip-floppers’ or soft on abortion (Allen 2010).10 
 This was not the first time Republicans had attempted this maneuver.  Throughout 2007, 
Republicans offered six MTRs increasing spending or opposition to illegal immigration on 
various pieces of legislation (Hunter 2007).  Most of the Democrats who voted in favor of these 
MTRs were vulnerable freshmen who lamented concerns to party leaders about having to 
repeatedly vote on immigration themed MTRs (Hunter 2007).  Thus, it appears that majority 
members are mindful of MTRs and are weary of their potential impact.  Republicans are not the 
only ones to implement such a strategy.  In 2012, the Democratic minority offered an MTR to a 
Republican tax cut bill.  According to Democrats, the tax cut legislation would help the rich and 
famous, including several companies that produce pornography.  The Democrats worded the 
MTR so that no business or individual that produces pornography could receive tax cuts (Strong 
2012).  This was an attempt to make Republican members seem supportive of granting cuts to 
pornographers.  While the MTR failed, it appeared to have its intended effect as Majority Leader 
Eric Cantor publically went on the defensive stating that the MTR was simply a ‘gimmick’ and 
would not change who received the tax cuts (Strong 2012).  Overall, these anecdotes provide 
some nascent evidence that majority members are quite concerned with how MTR votes are 
perceived by voters, particularly when the deal with salient issues.       
 
 
                                                             
10 In addition, several pro-life groups including the National Right to Life Committee and Americans United for 
Life, made statements and issued ads highlighting how supporting the Senate bill was a vote in favor of federally 
funded abortions.  While the MTR was never cited, the implications were clear that members had an opportunity to 
explicitly ban federally funded abortions.  
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MTR Votes and Position-Taking 
 As noted in the previous chapters, position-taking is a strategy implemented by the 
minority to differentiate its policies from those of the majority, in hopes of facilitating better 
election results.  Ultimately, position-taking predicts that the minority uses MTRs to provide 
minority members with an opportunity to make a public vote for a policy alternative to the 
majority’s preference.   So, whereas cross-pressuring only made prediction about majority votes 
for MTRs, position-taking only makes predications about which minority members support 
MTRs and when they do so.   
 To determine who should be using MTRs for position-taking, I look at who benefits the 
most from publicly separating themselves from the majority.  Simply put, minority members 
from more extreme districts (i.e., those most ideologically distant from the majority party) 
benefit most.  In extreme minority leaning districts, constituents are far more likely to disapprove 
of the majority, so members representing these districts are rational in separating themselves 
from the majority.  On the other hand, minority members from moderate districts run the risk of 
alienating portions of their constituents that prefer the majority party and its policies.  Thus, the 
more extreme a minority member’s district is, the more likely they are to support MTRs. 
 In addition, the ideological position of the legislation matters.  The more extreme (to the 
majority’s side) the legislation is, the likely minority members are to support MTRs.  More 
extreme legislation should make minority members from both moderate and extreme districts 
more supportive of MTRs.  In extreme districts, constituents not only disapprove of the majority 
but extreme majority legislation, so supporting MTRs on extreme legislation is an easy choice 
for minority members from extreme districts.  Moderate districts are less likely to prefer extreme 
legislation, so a minority member from a moderate district can support MTRs on extreme 
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legislation and claim they are taking a stand for moderation.  Furthermore, these relationships are 
highlighted on salient legislation.  In order to take a position, constituents must be mindful of the 
issue and the position, thus, the predictions of position-taking are stronger when saliency is high. 
This yields the following four hypotheses.  These hypotheses are similar to the ones for cross-
pressuring except they deal with minority members and the district ideological prediction goes in 
the opposite direction. 
 Minority District Hypothesis: Minority party members are more likely vote aye on MTRs 
the more extreme their district is. 
 Minority Extreme Legislation Hypothesis: Minority party members are more likely vote 
aye on MTRs the more extreme the legislation is. 
 Minority District/Legislation Hypothesis: Majority party members are more likely vote 
aye on MTRs the more moderate there district is and the more extreme the legislation is.   
 Minority Saliency Hypothesis: the impact of moderate districts, extreme legislation, and 
the combination of the two, should be stronger when the legislation being considered is salient. 
 The first three hypotheses highlight a problem with the strategy of position-taking 
through MTRs.  This problem is that position-taking neglects to help the minority members who 
need it the most.  Position-taking through MTRs helps minority members from extreme districts 
take positions; however, they are coming from extreme districts so they are less likely to need 
electoral help (Jacobson 1980 & 2004; Carson et al. 2010).  It is minority members coming from 
moderate districts who need the most electoral help, but using MTRs only allows them to take 
positions when the legislation is extreme.  Thus, as a strategy, position-taking through MTRs is 
only able to help the minority members who need it most part of the time.  Cross-pressuring does 
not suffer similar problems.  Cross-pressuring is always able to focus its attention on the most 
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susceptible majority members.  But, if could simply be that the majority dominated nature of the 
House only allows the minority a strategy where it can only help those who do not need help.  If 
this is the case, and position-taking is motivation MTR use, then the four hypotheses dealing 
with the minority party should be supported.  
Obstruction and MTR Votes 
 The predictions of the obstruction theory regarding MTR votes are rather straight 
forward.  Scholars argue that minority members are more likely to obstruct and agree with 
obstruction the further their ideological preferences are from the majority (Rohde 1991; Connelly 
& Pitney 1994; Dion 1997).  The logic is simple, the more extreme a minority member is, the 
more likely they are to want to prevent the majority from implementing its agenda.  Thus, 
obstruction predicts one rather simple hypothesis. 
 Minority Member Ideology Hypothesis: Minority party members are more likely vote aye 
on MTRs the more extreme their ideology is. 
 This hypothesis, however, is problematic.  Simply put, it is observationally equivalent 
with a pure preference model.  Krehbeil (1993 & 1998) argues that members of Congress make 
voting decision solely based on their ideological preferences.  Thus, an extreme minority 
member may support an MTR simply because it is closer to his or hers preferences than the 
majority’s legislation.  In this case, the MTR vote is a substantive policy vote for the member, 
not simply obstruction.  However, both obstruction and Krehbiel’s pure preference model predict 
the relationship between ideology and MTR support should be in the same direction so support 
for one should not forego support for the other.  Furthermore, neither theory has direct bearing 
on my theory of cross-pressuring; I use ideology to test obstruction, even though it has 
observation equivalence with another theory and actually increases the likelihood of finding 
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support for obstruction, because it is the best known predictor of which minority members 
obstruct.    
Data and Methods 
 The hypotheses generated in this chapter operate at two different levels of analysis:  the 
piece of legislation and the member.  As a result, I constructed a dataset in which the unit of 
analysis is the member-legislation dyad. To construct this dataset I focus on those bills and 
resolutions on which the minority offered a motion to recommit.  The dependent variable, then, 
is how a given member voted on a given motion:  an “aye” vote is coded 1 and a “nay” vote is 
coded 0.  Thus once again I employ logit to estimate the dependent variable.  I run models for 
majority and minority members separately to account for the different theoretical predictions of 
cross-pressuring and position-taking. Since my data are dyadic in nature, all models employ 
robust standard errors clustered on the individual member. 
 Several independent variables test the hypotheses of this chapter.  First, I control for the 
ideology of the member of Congress by implementing their DW-NOMINATE score.  I adjust 
DW-NOMINATE in the same manner I did in Chapter 2.  The Obstruction theory predicts this 
variable is negative and significant for minority members.  Next, we include our measure of the 
legislation’s location in ideological space, sponsor ideology, also once again adjusted so that a 
positive score reflects the majority party’s ideology.  Both cross-pressuring and position-taking 
predict that this variable is positive and significant. In addition, district partisanship is the 
percentage of voters in the district who voted for the presidential candidate of the member’s 
party in the most recent presidential election.  Highly pro-majority districts have a high value 
while moderate districts have a low value.  I use the same calculation in both the majority and 
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minority models.  Thus, in the minority models, a low score indicates the constituency agrees 
with the minority party. 
 I also include a dummy variable for salience.  I derive this measure from the salience 
score presented in Chapter 2.  However, instead of using the raw number of mentions in the New 
York Times, I adjust the score to a dummy with a one representing bills that received at least one 
mention.  I use a dummy for salience instead of the full measure for the sake of parsimony.  In 
the models, salience is interacted with several other variables, to make the results easier to 
understand, I use the dummy.  Finally, I implement several interactions into the models.  
Specifically, I include a three-way interaction between sponsor ideology, district partisanship, 
and the salience dummy.  The three-way interaction term and all of the constituent two-way 
interactions are included.  This allows me to determine exactly how these three variables are 
working together to predict MTR votes. 
 I also include several member-level and bill-level control variables. At the level of the 
member, I include dummy variables indicating whether the member was party leader or a 
committee chair (ranking minority member in the minority models).  Bill-level controls include a 
dummy for restrictive rules and appropriations bills, as well as the natural log of the word count 
to account for the complexity of the bill.  As noted in the previous chapter, cross-pressuring and 
position-taking predict the minority use MTR more frequently on restrictive rules.  In order to 
determine if similar patterns hold on MTR votes, I use separate models for all legislation, 
legislation with restrictive rules, and legislation with open rules.  The majority results (tests of 
cross-pressuring are presented in Table 3.1, the minority results (tests of position-taking) are 
presented in Tables 3.2. 
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Table 3.1 Probability of Majority Party Members Voting Aye on Motions to Recommit 
 
 
 
 
All 
Legislation 
 
Restrictive 
Rules 
 
Open 
Rules 
DW-NOMINATE 
 
-1.890*** 
 
-1.869*** 
 
-2.497*** 
  
(0.483) 
 
(0.505) 
 
(0.442) 
Sponsor NOMINATE 
 
1.240* 
 
0.739 
 
1.444 
  
(0.649) 
 
(0.765) 
 
(1.127) 
District Partisanship -0.022*** 
 
-0.029*** 
 
-0.020 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.010) 
Salience Dummy 
 
-2.640*** 
 
-1.838*** 
 
-2.924 
  
(0.483) 
 
(0.533) 
 
(2.592) 
Sponsor * District 
 
-0.062*** 
 
-0.040** 
 
-0.162*** 
  
(0.012) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.024) 
District * Salience 
 
0.070*** 
 
0.067*** 
 
0.009 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.066) 
Sponsor * Salience 
 
6.240*** 
 
5.423*** 
 
2.324 
  
(1.094) 
 
(1.245) 
 
(5.742) 
Sponsor * District * Salience -0.144*** 
 
-0.156*** 
 
0.087 
  
(0.024) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.146) 
Log of Word Count 
 
0.029*** 
 
0.026*** 
 
0.167*** 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.042) 
Restrictive Rule 
 
0.516*** 
 
-- 
 
-- 
  
(0.038) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
Party Leader 
 
-0.688** 
 
-0.621** 
 
-1.980*** 
  
(0.249) 
 
(0.224) 
 
(0.401) 
Committee Chair 
 
-0.347* 
 
-0.352 
 
-0.468 
  
(0.152) 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.233) 
Appropriations Bill 
 
0.032 
 
0.039 
 
0.271 
  
(0.028) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.136) 
Constant 
 
0.224 
 
0.878*** 
 
-0.497 
  
(0.229) 
 
(0.265) 
 
(0.617) 
N 
 
95808 
 
76907 
 
15047 
Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.155 
 
0.157 
 
0.365 
Log Pseudolikelihood -21159 
 
-17793 
 
-2042 
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses and are clustered by member.  Fixed effects for congressional 
sessions are not reported.  ^p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001, one-tailed tests.  
 
 
  
55 
 
Results for Majority MTR Support 
 Table 3.1 reports the results for the majority models.  In the model with all legislation, all 
of the variables used to test cross-pressuring (Sponsor NOMINATE, District Partisanship, 
salience), as well as all of their interactions, are significant.  In the restrictive rules model 
Sponsor NOMINATE fails to reach significance, but otherwise the results are similar to the full-
data model.  In the open rules model, however, only the Sponsor NOMINATE and District 
Partisanship interaction is significant.  This serves as another indication that the minority party 
primarily uses MTRs to cross-pressure majority party members on bills with restrictive rules. 
Direct interpretations of interactions (much less three-way interactions) proves difficult, thus I 
rely on predicted probabilities to aide in interpretation.
11
  More specifically, I graph the predicted 
probabilities of voting aye on MTRs depending on the sponsor’s ideology, for three types of 
majority districts: minority leaning (districts partisanship set at 39), moderate district (53), 
majority-leaning district (69).  The district partisanship values represent the tenth, fiftieth, and 
ninetieth percentiles respectively.  I present two charts each for the all legislation and restrictive 
rules models, one for salient legislation, the other for non-salient legislation.  I omit charts for the 
open rules model because much of the predicted interaction breaks down under bills with open 
rules.  The predicted probabilities for the majority model are presented in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.  
Figure 3.1 shows the probabilities for all legislation; Figure 3.2 shows the probabilities for 
legislation with restrictive rules. 
 Figure 3.1 A shows the predicted probabilities for non-salient legislation.  For all non-
salient legislation, all majority members are less likely to vote aye on MTRs the more extreme 
the legislation’s sponsor is, regardless of their district.  However, majority members from  
                                                             
11 Predicted probabilities are obtained using CLARIFY (Tomz et al 2001), with all variables other than the key 
independent variables set to their median values. 
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Figure 3.1 Predicted Probabilities of Majority Aye Votes on MTRs, All Legislation 
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minority-leaning districts are far more likely to support MTRs than those from moderate or 
majority-leaning districts, regardless of the extremity of the bill.  Similar patterns hold in Figure 
3.1 B, which looks at salient legislation.  Figure 3.1 B shows a greater drop off in the probability 
of supporting MTRs for majority-leaning districts.  Furthermore, the difference in the likelihood 
of supporting MTRs is greatest between minority-leaning and majority-leaning on extreme 
legislation with closed rules.  This finding is supportive of cross-pressuring as more moderate 
districts are more likely to support MTRs on more extreme legislation.  Figures 3.1 A and B look 
very similar to the figures in 3.1 and indicate similar findings.    
 The predicted probabilities simultaneously support and contradict the cross-pressuring 
theory.  On one hand, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 bear out the notion that "minority-leaning” majority 
districts are more supportive of MTRs.  This is seen in the fact that the dashed line and the solid 
line are consistently above the dotted line.  In addition, under restrictive rules majority members 
from minority-leaning districts are far more likely to support MTRs on extreme legislation than 
those from majority-leaning districts.  Both of these are very much predictions of cross-
pressuring.  However, cross-pressuring also predicts that the slopes of lines for minority-leaning 
districts and moderate-districts should be sloping upwards.  This would indicate and increased 
likelihood of supporting MTRs as the ideology of the bill becomes more extreme.  However, in 
all of the figures, all of the lines slope downward, indicating the majority members are less likely 
to vote for MTRs the more extreme the bill is, regardless of district ideology or salience.  This 
finding is contrary to the predictions of cross-pressuring. 
 One possible explanation for this finding comes from King and Zeckhauser (2003), who 
argue that party leaders in Congress use ‘vote options.’  Instead of using the costly and 
inefficient strategy of ‘vote buying,’ outright purchasing support of legislation whether through  
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Figure 3.2 Predicted Probabilities of Majority Aye Votes on MTRs, Legislation with Restrictive  
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sticks or carrots, leaders give electorally vulnerable members vote options, which are only used 
if needed.  This allows leaders to save resources (only using sticks and carrots when needed) and 
allows vulnerable members to vote with their constituents, without reaping partisan punishment. 
 Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that majority leaders are activating fewer vote options on 
moderate legislation than on extreme legislation.  According to cross-pressuring, MTRs are 
moderate by nature, thus, there is far less difference between a moderate piece of legislation and 
the MTR than an extreme piece of legislation and the MTR.  In essence, majority leaders 
understand that members need to be supportive of their district on MTRs, so they allow members 
to vote in favor of the MTR on moderate legislation.  However, on extreme legislation, leaders 
need every vote, so they cannot allow vote options and force members to vote against the MTR.  
Thus, it is more costly for majority members to defect from the party on extreme legislation than 
moderate legislation, so they are less likely to support MTRs on extreme bills.   
This logic is also seen in the differences between minority-leaning and majority-leaning 
districts in figures 3.1 B and 3.2 B, dealing with salient legislation.  On salient legislation, the 
probability of supporting MTRs for minority-leaning and majority-leaning districts greatly 
diverges.  This indicates that on moderate and salient legislation, majority leaders are allowing 
more vote options, however, as the extremity of the bill increases, leaders offer few vote options, 
particularly to majority-leaning districts, as they are less likely to need the option for electoral 
purposes.  In fact, as salient legislation reaches its peak extremity (approximately .7) in either 
figure, the probability that a member from a majority-leaning district supports an MTR is 
virtually nil.  Once again, indicating majority leaders are issuing some sort of vote option on 
MTRs, but that the vote options dwindle as legislation becomes more extreme and districts 
become more partisan.  
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 Overall, the findings of Table 3.1 provide adequate support for cross-pressuring.  All of 
the predictions of cross-pressuring were supported, except for the notion that extreme legislation 
is more likely to result in MTR support from majority members.  However, this contrary finding 
can be explained using existing knowledge of how majority leaders negotiate and purchase votes 
among the rank-and-file.  
Results for Minority MTR Support 
 Table 3.2 reports the results of the minority party models.  Specifically, these models are 
used to test the predictions of the position-taking and obstruction theories.  First, in all three 
models, DW-NOMINATE is negative and significant, supporting the prediction of obstruction.  
This indicates three possibilities.  First, the minority party is implementing MTRs as a form of 
obstruction.  Second, minority members use their pure preferences (Krehbiel 1998) to make 
MTR voting decisions.  Third, the some combination of the first two explanations describes 
minority voting on MTRs.  Due to the observational equivalence of the minority member 
ideology hypothesis it is impossible to tell what is driving this results, however, it is clear that 
ideology plays a significant role in determining the MTR votes of minority members.      
 The predictions of position-taking receive moderate support at best.  Minority members 
from more extreme districts are more likely to support MTRs.  This finding is seen in Table 3.2 
with the positive and significant results for district partisanship, and in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, in 
which the lines representing extreme minority districts are consistently above the other two 
lines.
12
  However, the other predictions of position-taking do not find support in the results.  
Specifically, bill ideology does not increase MTR support.  According to the predicted 
probabilities, minority members from minority-leaning districts almost always support MTRs,  
                                                             
12
 The predicted probabilities for the minority figures were calculated in the same fashion as the majority figures.  
Note, however, the in the minority figures, minority-leaning districts are now the extreme districts and majority-
leaning districts are the moderate districts. 
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Table 3.2 Probability of Minority Party Members Voting Aye on Motions to Recommit 
 
 
 
  
All Legislation 
Restrictive 
Rules 
 
Open 
Rules 
 DW-NOMINATE 
 
-1.907*** 
 
-1.935*** 
 
-2.024*** 
 
   
(0.295) 
 
(0.330) 
 
(0.293) 
 Sponsor NOMINATE 
 
-1.020 
 
-0.621 
 
-1.728 
 
   
(0.567) 
 
(0.581) 
 
(1.279) 
 District Partisanship 0.033*** 
 
0.041*** 
 
0.014 
 
   
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.010) 
 Log of Word Count 
 
-0.016 
 
0.039*** 
 
-0.244*** 
 
   
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.019) 
 Salience Dummy 
 
1.564** 
 
1.486* 
 
0.501 
 
   
(0.597) 
 
(0.755) 
 
(1.015) 
 Sponsor * District 
 
0.011 
 
0.006 
 
0.017 
 
   
(0.010) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.023) 
 District * Salience 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.014 
 
0.048** 
 
   
(0.012) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.021) 
 Sponsor * Salience 
 
-4.543*** 
 
-4.423*** 
 
-1.553 
 
   
(1.184) 
 
(1.393) 
 
(2.279) 
 Sponsor * District * Salience 0.055* 
 
0.055^ 
 
-0.080 
 
   
(0.024) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.045) 
 Party Leader 
 
0.674** 
 
0.768** 
 
0.456 
 
   
(0.219) 
 
(0.276) 
 
(0.221) 
 Ranking Minority Member 
 
0.128 
 
0.182^ 
 
0.009 
 
   
(0.094) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.103) 
 Appropriations Bill 
 
0.368*** 
 
0.195*** 
 
0.654*** 
 
   
(0.036) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.071) 
 Restrictive Rule 
 
0.459*** 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
   
(0.039) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 Constant 
  
0.288 
 
-0.101 
 
2.987*** 
 
   
(0.288) 
 
(0.318) 
 
(0.603) 
 N 
  
82842 
 
66642 
 
16200 
 Pseudo R2 
 
0.116 
 
0.127 
 
0.139 
 Log Pseudolikelihood -22038 
 
-16362 
 
-5221 
 Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses and are clustered by member.  Fixed effects for congressional 
sessions are not reported.  ^p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001, one-tailed tests.  
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regardless of the bill ideology.  In addition, members from moderate or majority-leaning districts 
are less likely to support MTRs on extreme legislation, particularly when the legislation is 
salient.  This finding explicitly highlights the problem with position-taking as a strategy.  
Minority members from moderate districts do not take advantage of the strategy when they need 
it most, on extreme and salient legislation.  Furthermore, members from extreme districts, who 
do not necessarily need to position-take, are those that benefit from the strategy the most. 
 Bill ideology is not acting as position-taking predicts, in reality minority members from 
more moderate districts are less likely to support MTRs on extreme and salient legislation.  Thus, 
the results do not conform to the expectations of position-taking, which provides yet more 
evidence that the primary motivation behind MTR support is cross-pressuring. Ultimately, the 
data show two very clear trends among the minority party.  The first is that individual ideology 
matters.  More extreme minority members are far more likely to support MTRs.  The second is 
that minority members from more moderate districts are less likely to support MTRs on extreme 
and salient legislation.  I posit that both of these trends are explained by the notion that the 
minority is using MTRs for cross-pressuring.  If the minority is using MTRs for cross-pressuring, 
minority leaders should not care how their members vote.  Thus, minority members are left to 
their own devices to determine MTR votes.  Minority members in turn rely on their own 
ideological preferences, or if they are from a more moderate districts decide to vote against the 
MTR if the bill is extreme and salient, not wanting to appear too partisan.  This explanation loses 
some credence to the obstruction hypothesis.  Technically, extreme minority members may be 
attempting to obstruct, not just voting their preferences.  However, in the next chapter, I show 
that obstruction is not a likely motivation for introducing MTRs because these motions do not 
substantively slow the House legislative process. 
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Figure 3.3 Predicted Probabilities of Minority Aye Votes on MTRs, All Legislation 
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3.4 A 
 
 
3.4 B 
 
Figure 3.4 Predicted Probabilities of Minority Aye Votes on MTRs, Legislation with Restrictive  
 
Rules 
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Conclusion 
  This chapter presented and tested the theoretical regarding support for MTRs.  
Ultimately, this chapter provides the most support to cross-pressuring.  Majority members from 
moderate districts are more likely to support MTRs, particularly on extreme and salient 
legislation.  This finding very much implies that the minority crafts MTRs to attract policy 
moderates and that moderate majority members are very much aware and concerned about how 
their MTR votes are perceived by voters.  The empirical tests of this chapter, however, provide 
one slight obstacle for cross-pressuring.  Cross-pressuring predicts that moderate majority 
members are more supportive of MTRs the more extreme the legislation is.  This prediction is 
not directly supported in the results.  However, a rather straightforward explanation can be used 
to see why this prediction is not practically realized.  Simply put, majority leaders appear more 
willing to let the rank-and-file defect on moderate legislation than extreme.  Overall, cross-
pressuring is the best explanation of MTR support. 
 Position-taking receives only a modest amount of support.  Position-taking posits that 
minority members from extreme districts are more likely to approve MTRs.  This finding is 
borne out, however, the rest of the predictions of position-taking are not supported.  Thus, it does 
not appear that position-taking is not used by minority members when making voting decisions 
on MTRs. 
 Obstruction, likewise receives only modest support.  While the specific hypothesis 
predicted by obstruction is supported, it is not theoretically clear if the hypothesis is truly 
addressing obstruction.  The same hypothesis could be used to test the ideological preferences of 
minority members.  If ideology is a proper proxy for the desire to obstruct, then obstruction 
receives support, if not, then minority members are simply making preferential votes, not 
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obstruction votes.  Unfortunately, due to the equivalency of the theoretical expectations there is 
no way to determine which theory is being supported.  Furthermore, if MTR votes are pure 
preference votes for minority members, then this finding actually supports cross-pressuring.  
While cross-pressuring makes no specific predictions about minority votes, it implies that the 
minority is concerned about majority behavior on MTRs, not minority behavior.  Thus, minority 
leaders leave MTR decisions up to the members themselves and simply decided based on their 
ideology.   
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Chapter 4 
Effects of Motions to Recommit 
 Throughout this project I have focused on three theories that seek to explain the 
minority’s use of the motion to recommit in the House.  In this chapter, I examine what each 
theory predicts about MTRs’ broader legislative and electoral effects.  I then test these 
predictions to determine which theory best represents the ultimate effects of MTRs.  I conduct 
analysis of the impact of MTRs on both the majority and minority party, in addition to an 
analysis of how successful MTRs are at delaying the House legislative process. Determining the 
legislative outcomes of MTRs establishes whether the minority is aggressively attacking the 
majority, obstructing the majority, or simply taking care of its own positions.   
Cross-Pressuring and Majority Election Results 
For cross-pressuring to be an effective strategy, MTR votes must impact majority 
member’s vote shares.  Cross-pressuring is an electoral strategy that intentionally targets 
majority members from moderate districts who are forced to vote on ideologically extreme 
legislation.  The end result is that these certain majority members must choose between their 
district or party, and due to the heavy influence of majority leaders on procedural votes 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001; Jenkins et al 2005; Snyder and Groseclose 2000), voting with the 
district is unlikely.  Thus, the goal of cross-pressuring is to cause electoral damage to majority 
party members, particularly those from moderate districts.   
 If, however, voters do not notice MTRs and do not punish members of Congress for 
MTR votes, then cross-pressuring is not a viable strategy for the minority party.  This begs the 
question; do voters notice and punish members of Congress (specifically majority members) for 
MTR votes that go against the district’s preferences?  At first glance, the answer to this question 
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appears to be ‘no.’ American political knowledge is dreadfully low (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996), to the point that most Americans cannot identify their members of Congress, much less 
how they vote on minute procedures.  However, a closer look at the congressional literature, as 
well as news and academic accounts of MTRs, reveal a different picture.   
 First, the literature reveals that individual votes cast in the House can have a significant 
impact on electoral outcomes.  Carson and Bovitz (2006) show that more controversial votes, as 
well as votes that increase intra-party disagreement, garner the interest of attentive publics (e.g. 
interest groups and challengers).  These attentive publics (Arnold 1990) use their influence over 
voters to impact elections.  Furthermore, Nyhan et al. (2012) argue that individual votes can 
make members seem ideologically extreme, and voters in turn punish members at the polls for 
being extreme.  Hence, existing evidence shows that there is a significant correlation between 
member’s roll call decisions and their vote shares, with more ideologically extreme, 
controversial, and partisan votes causing the most damage to vote shares. In addition, strong 
evidence suggests that party loyalty is detrimental to member’s electoral chances (Carson et al. 
2010).  Thus, just as individual roll call votes can be detrimental to vote shares, so too are high 
levels of party loyalty.  Cross-pressuring very much plays off of this notion.  So, even if voters 
do not pay attention to MTR votes the minority is still providing majority members opportunities 
to increase their party loyalty, which could prove detrimental to the majority members. 
 Second, the minority party takes pains to publicize MTR votes.  During the 110th 
Congress, for example, minority Republicans used to the motion "to incorporate language that 
would put Democrats on record as having voted...for example against a proposed tax 
cut....[They] crafted motions designed to put conservative and moderate Democrats in 
Republican-leaning districts on the spot... When a conservative Democrat voted against [a 
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motion to recommit], the Republicans were often quick to shoot out press releases highlighting 
his or her vote " (Peters and Rosenthal 2010).  Throughout 2011 and 2012, the now Democratic 
minority returned the favor by using MTRs to force Republicans to vote against publicly 
disclosing whether they accept government sponsored health insurance (Hunter 2011) and 
expansion of grants aimed at preventing domestic violence in the 2012 Violence Against Women 
Act (Clawson 2012).  More specifically, a recent press release from Rep. Jerrold Nadler 
(Democrat NY-8) criticized members of the Republican majority for rejecting an MTR that 
provided twenty million dollars in grants for domestic violence prevention (Nadler, May 10, 
2012).
13
  Thus, the minority certainly uses MTRs to publically frame members of the majority as 
deviating from the wishes of voters.  Furthermore, the strategy appears to somewhat effective as 
several media reports on the 2012 Violence Against Women Act indicate that Republicans were 
under fire for the content of the legislation and their refusal to include Democratic expansions of 
grants and protections (Pear 2012; Kapur 2012). Those expansions were proposed in the MTR.  
 Ultimately, cross-pressuring predicts that voters notice and punish majority members for 
improper MTR votes and furthermore that the effect of MTRs on electoral outcomes is stronger 
in moderate districts than extreme.  Specifically, two hypotheses are derived regarding the effect 
of MTRs on majority electoral success.  
 Cross-pressuring Hypothesis 1: The more a majority member votes in favor of MTRs 
(thereby voting against his or her party) the higher his or her vote share is.  Conversely, the more 
a majority member votes against MTRs (for the party, against the district) the lower the vote 
share.  This hypothesis tests whether voters notice and punish majority members for MTR votes 
that deviate from the district.  While brief anecdotal evidence of this hypothesis is provided 
                                                             
13 House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi gave a similar account of the Violence Against Women Act of 2012 in a 
press release, however, she does not specifically mention the MTR (Pelosi 2012). 
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above, I conduct a systematic test to determine whether MTRs impact majority vote shares over 
a large time frame including many issues. 
 Cross-Pressuring Hypothesis 2: The effect of MTR support on majority vote shares is 
stronger in moderate districts than extreme districts.  If the minority is cross-pressuring, then 
they are crafting MTRs to be attractive to policy moderates.  This means that MTRs will not be 
preferred by extreme majority districts.  As such, majority members from extreme districts can 
vote against MTRs without fear of electoral punishment.  However, moderate districts prefer the 
MTR, so majority members from these districts will be punished for voting against MTRs. 
Position-Taking and Minority Election Results 
 As noted throughout this project, MTRs allow the minority to obtain a vote on its policy 
preference, regardless of the rules governing the bill.  The minority, it is thought, can use this 
ability to differentiate itself from the minority, in essence using MTRs for position-taking 
(Wolfensberger 2007; Oleszek 2011).  If the minority is using MTR for position-taking purposes, 
then the end result is that supporting MTRs should increase the electoral success of minority 
members.  Simply put, position-taking is designed to assist re-election goals (Mayhew 1974), so 
the minority should be reaping electoral assistance from MTRs, if their purpose is position-
taking.  More specifically, minority members who support MTRs are doing so wanting to, not 
only establish their position, but also differentiate themselves from the majority because they feel 
their voters do not like the majority’s position.  This logic reveals two predictions. 
 Position-taking Hypothesis 1: The more a minority member supports MTRs, the higher 
his or her vote share is.  If minority members see electoral advantages in distinguishing 
themselves from the majority, they can do so by supporting MTRs.  Thus, the more a minority 
member chooses to support MTRs, the more electorally successful he or she should be. 
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 Position-taking Hypothesis 2: The effect of MTR support on minority vote share is 
stronger in more extreme districts.  In extreme minority districts, voters are less likely to prefer 
the majority, thus, minority members are rewarded more for distinguishing themselves from the 
majority. Again, this highlights the problem with using position-taking as a strategy.  It helps the 
minority members who need it least.  Extreme members need electoral help less than moderate 
members, and need less assistance in differentiating themselves from the majority.  Thus, 
position-taking is not helping the minority members who need it most.    
Obstruction and the House Process 
 In addition to influencing electoral outcomes, it is believed that MTRs delay or obstruct 
House floor proceedings (Lynch 2008).  To be clear, Lynch gives a procedural account of MTRs 
with few theoretical implications.  However, she reveals several quotes and floor comments from 
majority members of Congress that express concern that the minority uses MTRs for obstruction 
slowing down the House process (Lynch 2008).  Thus, it is evident that members of House 
themselves feel MTRs can be exploited to obstruct the legislative process.   
 On the other hand, academic accounts of House procedures provided mixed evidence on 
the question of whether the minority is able to obstruct the majority.  Scholars argue that certain 
House procedures like points of order (Dion 1997), discharge petitions (Binder 1997), and 
journal votes (Rohde 1991) obstruct the majority and stall the legislative process.  However, Cox 
and McCubbins (2005) have shown that modern rule changes have consistently favored the 
majority and Patty (2010) argues that even seemingly obstructive tactics like journal votes are 
used to benefit the majority party.  Ultimately though, no existing study directly has directly 
addressed whether the minority can actually slow down or prevent the majority’s agenda, so 
much of the claims regarding obstruction are speculative and theoretical.    
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 If MTRs are valid tools of minority obstruction then they should be able to significantly 
and substantively stop or slow down the legislative process in the House. Testing this claim not 
only speaks to the strategies of the minority but also to the agenda control of the majority.  If 
MTRs can successful obstruct the majority agenda control, then standing assumptions of 
majority powers in the House must be reconsidered (Cox and McCubbins 1993 & 2005; Sinclair 
1997; Roberts 2005; Cox et al. 2002).  Ultimately, Obstruction makes one prediction regarding 
the effects of MTRs. 
 Obstruction Hypothesis: Motions to recommit increase the amount of time it takes to pass 
legislation on the House floor.  
Majority Election Results Analysis 
In this section, I examine whether votes on the motion to recommit influence majority 
members' vote shares when they run for reelection and thus, whether voter notice MTR votes and 
punish members of Congress for supporting the party on MTRs.  To do this, I estimate an OLS 
model with the dependent variable being the member's share of the two-party vote.  For this 
estimation, I include all majority party members seeking reelection between 1978 and 2004.  The 
key independent variable is MTR support, coded as the percent of all votes to adopt a motion to 
recommit which the member voted "aye" on.  A high value of MTR support indicates that the 
member sided with the minority party, and against his party, often.  I predict that consistent party 
support (low values of MTR support ) leads to lower vote shares, and  voting with the minority 
(high values of MTR support) leads to higher vote shares.  Thus, the prediction I test is that the 
coefficient on MTR support is positive and significant.  Furthermore, I interact MTR Support 
with district partisanship, the vote share the presidential candidate of the incumbents party 
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received in the previous presidential election, to test the Cross-pressuring Hypothesis.  I expect 
the coefficient on the interaction to be negative and significant. 
The degree to which a member votes with the party on motions to recommit is closely 
related, both theoretically and empirically, with his or her level of party support more generally.  
I operationalize broad party support as the traditionally-used party unity score, coded as the 
percent of times a member votes with the party, on those votes in which a majority of one party 
vote against a majority of the other party.  Theoretically, I should expect that members who are 
willing to defy their party will express this defiance, in part, on votes to adopt the motion to 
recommit.  Empirically, this bears out in my data, as MTR support and party unity score correlate 
at r=.71 among majority party members.  Since party support  has already been shown to 
negatively affect members' vote shares (Carson et al 2010), this sets up an inferential problem for 
this analysis.  If I find a significant relationship between MTR support and vote share, this may 
simply reflect a more general party unity affect.  In other words, the correlation might be caused 
by the members' overall levels of party unity, and not specifically by votes on whether to adopt 
the motion to recommit.  As a result, I include party unity as a control variable in several of the 
models I present.  Party unity should be negatively related to vote share, as a positive score 
indicates high support for the party.  
 Other control variables account for factors which are commonly found to influence 
congressional elections.  Presidential vote is, as above, the share of the two-party vote that the 
presidential candidate of the incumbent's party received in the congressional district.  Challenger 
Quality is a dummy variable coded 1 if the challenger had previously held elective office and 0 
otherwise.  Spending gap measures the degree of advantage (or disadvantage) the incumbent had 
in electoral spending.  It is measured as the natural log of challenger expenditures minus the 
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natural log of incumbent expenditures. Freshman is a dummy variable coded 1 if the incumbent 
is a freshman, 0 otherwise, and is multiplied by -1 for members not of the president's party.  
Presidential approval is the Gallup score taken during the fall of the election year.  Change in 
Real Disposable Income is taken from the third quarter of the election year. Finally, I include 
election-year dummy variables to account for fixed effects by year.  In general, my models 
emulate Carson et al's (2010) Table 1, Model 4.
14
 
 The results of my models are presented in Table 4.1.  The election year dummies are not 
reported. For the sake of illustration, Model 1 includes MTR support, but not party unity. Results 
are as predicted:  MTR support is positive and significant.  Since these models are OLS, 
coefficients are directly interpretable.  The range on MTR support is from 0 (indicating that the 
majority member voted with his or her party on every vote to adopt the motion to recommit) to 1 
(indicating that the member voted with the minority party on every such vote).  Thus, the 
coefficient represents the expected difference in vote share between members on the extremes of 
the theoretical range for MTR support.  In this case, the empirical range matches the theoretical - 
at least some majority members supported none, and some supported all, of the motions to 
recommit in each Congress.  According to Model 1, the members who supported all MTR scores 
would be expected to do 4.64 percentage points better at the polls than the members who stuck 
with their party and voted against all of the motions to recommit.  
A tougher test of the effect that motions to recommit can have on majority members' vote 
shares is presented in Model 2, which includes party unity.  Here, party unity has the expected 
positive and significant relationship with vote share.  More interesting for my purposes is that 
MTR support remains positive and significantly related to vote share.  The effect of MTR support  
                                                             
14
 The major difference between my model and that of Carson (2010) is that they run a 2SLS to account for the 
endogeneity between DW-NOMINATE and party unity.  Since I do not include DW-NOMINATE in my model, we 
estimate only the second stage of their model.  
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Table 4.1 Support for Motions to Recommit and Reelection Vote Shares For Majority Party  
Members 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
District Partisanship 29.7*** 32.8*** 31.7*** 33.9*** -4.19 3.34 
 (1.45) (1.54) (1.76) (1.81) (11.5) (8.78) 
Quality Challenger -1.58*** -1.50*** -1.59*** -1.52*** -1.53*** -1.54*** 
 (.334) (.332) (.334) (.332) (.331) (.331) 
Spending Gap -2.05*** -2.07*** -2.05*** -2.08** -2.09*** -2.09*** 
 (.093) (.092) (.093) (.092) (.092) (.092) 
Freshman 1.32** 1.21** 1.31*** -1.21*** 1.22** 1.22*** 
 (.427) (.425) (.427) (.424) (.424) (.424) 
Presidential Approval .047 .037 .044 .035 .029 .029 
 (.137) (.136) (.137) (.136) (.136) (.136) 
Δ Real personal income -.366 -.416 -.404 -.439 -.481 -4.88 
 (.401) (.399) (.402) (.399) (.398) (.398) 
Lagged Incumbent Vote .348*** .333*** .345*** .331*** .326*** .325*** 
 (.018) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
MTR Support 4.64*** 1.72* 11.65*** 6.28 -2.91 1.74* 
 (.845) (.998) (.377) (3.89) (4.76) (.995) 
MTR Support*District Partisanship -- -- -13.84* -8.83 9.01 -- 
   26) (7.28) (9.02)  
Party Unity -- -7.54*** -- -7.31*** -26.9*** -23.3*** 
  (1.39)  (1.41) (6.04) (4.82) 
Party Unity*District Partisanship -- -- -- -- 40.2*** 33.1*** 
     (12.1) (9.72) 
Constant 21.7*** 28.0*** 20.9*** 27.3*** 46.0*** 42.2*** 
 (1.14) (1.61) (1.21) (1.71) (5.88) (4.48) 
N 1968 1968 1968 1968 1968 1968 
Adj R2 .558 .561 .556 .559 .559 .558 
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses and are clustered by member.  Fixed effects for congressional 
sessions are not reported.  ^p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001, one-tailed tests.  
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is attenuated to be sure - the maximum effect that these votes can have on members’ vote share is 
estimated to be only 1.72 percentage points here.  However, it is notable that at least some 
vestige of the relationship exists independently of the relationship between party unity and vote 
share more generally - especially since the votes used to calculate members' party unity scores 
included votes on whether to adopt motions to recommit.  Also because of this, I find it unlikely 
that the true magnitude of the effect of recommittal votes - in and of themselves, independent of 
other displays of party unity - have on majority vote shares is reflected in either Model 1 or 
Model 2.  Rather, I believe that the true magnitude lies somewhere in between those two figures. 
 Models 3-5 investigate whether the effect of MTR support on majority members' vote 
shares is greatest in moderate districts.  I do this by interacting both MTR support and party unity 
on district partisanship.  Taken as a whole, the results of these models indicate that this is likely 
not the case.  When MTR support*district partisanship is included in a model which lacks Party 
Unity, the relationship is significant and in the expected direction (Model 3).  However, 
reintroducing party unity to the model (Model 4) renders the interactive variable not significant.  
Also, in this model, MTR support itself falls just short of statistical significance (p< .052, one-
tailed test).  Model 5 includes both party unity and party unity*district partisanship, and here as 
well neither MTR support nor MTR support*district partisanship is significant.  Although, party 
unity and party unity*district partisanship are both strongly significant, indicating that partisan 
legislative behavior is most costly to majority members in moderate districts.  Finally, Model 6 
confirms that the relationship between MTR support and members' vote share - unaffected by an 
interaction - survives when I include party unity*district partisanship in the model.  Results 
indicate that the relationship is still statistically significant, as both the coefficient and standard 
error on MTR support are virtually unchanged from Model 2. 
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Overall, these results provide decent support for cross-pressuring.  While the relationship 
between MTR support and vote shares is influenced by party unity (see Models 4 & 5), the 
expected relationship remains even after the inclusion of the proper party unity controls (Model 
6).  This indicates that cross-pressuring assists the minority in achieving its primary goal, 
obtaining majority status.  This finding is further cemented in Figure 4.1which plots the 
predicted probabilities of the impact of MTR support in both moderate and extreme districts from 
Model 3 of Table 4.1.
15
  In Figure 4.1, the solid line represents moderate districts.  If a majority 
member from a moderate district goes from never supporting MTRs (always voting with the 
party and thus against the district) to always supporting MTRs (supporting the district and not 
the party), they can expect a roughly five percent increase in their vote share, with all of the 
controls set at their median.  The dashed line represents extreme districts.  If a majority member 
from an extreme district moves from no MTR support to full MTR support they can expect 
around a two percent increase in their vote share.  Furthermore, the marginal effects of the two 
lines indicate that the impact of MTR support in moderate districts is significant, while the 
impact on extreme districts is insignificant.  Ultimately, these findings support both of the 
predictions cross-pressuring makes regarding majority vote shares. 
Minority Election Result Analysis 
 To test the ultimate predictions of position-taking, I estimated a model using much of the 
same data as above but for the minority party.  More specifically, the model I use replicates 
Model 4 of Table 4.1, but for minority party members.  I use this model because MTR score and 
the interaction fail to reach significance in any other specification.  Thus, the model is the best  
                                                             
15 Predicted probabilities are obtained using CLARIFY (Tomz et al 2001), with all variables other than MTR score, 
district partisanship, and MTR*District set to their median values. A moderate district is defined as having a district 
partisan score at .45, an extreme district is defined at .70.  The lines represent the full range of MTR scores.  In the 
majority, some members had perfect MTR support (1), while other had a perfect lack of support (0).  Thus, the lines 
trace the expected change in vote share as a member of the majority goes from no to perfect support of MTRs.  
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Figure 4.1 Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of MTR Support on Majority Vote Shares  
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case scenario for position-taking.  In order to find support for position-taking the results must 
indicate that MTR support increases minority member’s electoral share and that the effect is 
greater in extreme districts.  Table 4.2 reports the results for the minority model. The MTR 
support score is significant, as well as the interaction between MTR support and district 
partisanship.  However, district partisanship by itself is insignificant.  To provide a more clear 
explanation of the interactive effect, I provide the predicted probabilities of minority members’ 
electoral shares in Figure 4.2.  The predicated probabilities were calculated using the same 
method as those in Figure 4.1. 
 Figure 4.2 shows that there is a substantive difference between moderate and extreme 
majority districts.  In fact, minority members from extreme districts receive a great deal of 
benefit from supporting MTRs.  Vote shares increase five percent for minority members from 
extreme districts who go from not supporting MTRs at all to having full MTR support.  This  
result supports position-taking because, not only does MTR support increase electoral success 
for minority members but much more so for those from extreme districts.  However, minority 
members from moderate districts do not receive any sort of benefit from supporting MTRs, in 
fact, they are punished.  If a minority member from a moderate district goes from no MTR 
support to full MTR support, their vote share drops by approximately three and a half percent.  
This finding goes against position-taking hypothesis 1 which states MTR support should help 
minority members.  Furthermore, Figure 4.2 drives home the point that position-taking as a 
strategy itself is flawed because it does not help the minority members who need it most. 
MTRs as Obstruction Analysis 
MTRs are only a viable dilatory tactic if they actually obstruct or slow down the 
legislative process in the House.  I test the dilatory capacity of MTRs by looking at the time it  
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Table 4.2 Support for Motions to Recommit and Reelection Vote Shares For Minority Party  
Members 
  
Model 1 
 District Partisanship 
 
-4.276 
 
  
(6.456) 
 Quality Challenger 
 
-1.842*** 
 
  
(0.368) 
 Spending Gap 
 
-2.503*** 
 
  
(0.111) 
 Freshman 
 
1.714*** 
 
  
(0.433) 
 Presidential Approval 
 
0.226*** 
 
  
(0.018) 
 Midterm Election 
 
-4.821*** 
 
  
(0.388) 
 Party of President 
 
2.523*** 
 
  
(0.429) 
 Δ Real personal income 
 
-0.226* 
 
  
(0.091) 
 Lagged Incumbent Vote 
 
0.316*** 
 
  
(0.018) 
 MTR Score 
 
-18.399*** 
 
  
(4.294) 
 District Partisanship * MTR Score 
 
33.655*** 
 
  
(7.503) 
 Party Unity 
 
-0.052*** 
 
  
(0.012) 
 Constant 
 
45.820*** 
 
  
(3.826) 
 N 
 
1551 
 Adj R2 
 
0.668 
 Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses and are clustered by member.  Fixed effects for congressional 
sessions are not reported.  ^p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001, one-tailed tests.  
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Figure 4.2 Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of MTR Support on Minority Vote Shares  
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takes for legislation to make it through the House floor process.  I create a variable called 
passage time, which calculates the time it takes a bill to pass from the time it received its first 
legislative action on the House floor.  I collected this data using the date and time stamp from the 
legislative history from the Library of Congress' website which warehouses information on bills 
and their passage through the legislative process, Thomas.loc.gov.  Passage time is constructed 
from the date, hour, and minute each legislation received its first floor action, and the same 
information about when the bill passed.  If a bill did not pass the chamber the terminal time for 
the legislation is the end of the congressional session.  Ultimately, I coded passage time to 
measure the number of hours it takes legislation to pass.  I incorporated Passage time into the 
data set from Chapter 2, therefore, I am examining all contentious legislation from the 101
st
 – 
110
th
 House and the unit of analysis is the floor action.  In the data set, 1413 did not receive an 
MTR with instructions; the average passage time for these bills is 24 hours with a standard 
deviation of 236 hours.  For the 585 bills that did receive an MTR with instructions the average 
passage time is 35.6 hours with a standard deviation of 140.4 hours.
16
  However, a difference of 
means test indicates that the difference is not statistically significant (p<.269). Thus, preliminary 
evidence suggests that MTRs are not obstructing the House process. 
 Going beyond averages, I estimate a model which employs passage time as the dependent 
variable. Duration models allow for the implementation of time based dependent variable and 
reveal whether independent variables prevent an event from occurring, in this case bill passage, 
and slow down or speed the occurrence of the event (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). 
Specifically, I use a Cox Proportional Hazard model, which is the preferred duration model as it 
makes no assumption about the underlying risk of the event occurring (Box-Steffensmeier and 
                                                             
16 The distribution for passage time is very much skewed towards zero.  In fact, about 1,500 of the 2,013 floor 
actions pass in the first five hours of floor debate.  This skewness accounts for the smaller standard deviations. 
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Jones 2004).
17
  Cox models report hazard ratios instead of coefficients.  Hazard ratios do not 
follow standard interpretations.  For hazard ratios, values less than one indicate a lower risk of 
the event occurring and indicate that a variable is slowing down the passage of legislation.  
Hazard ratios over one indicate that the event is more at risk of occurring, meaning that variables 
with ratios over one speed up the passage of bills.  Moreover, the further away the hazard ratio is 
from one, the larger the effect of the independent variable. 
 The key independent variable in the duration model is a dummy indicating whether the 
legislation received an MTR with instructions.  If MTRs are successful at obstructing the House 
floor process than the hazard ratio for MTRs should be less than one and significant.  I include 
several other control variables in the model, all of which were used in Chapter 2.  I control for 
the ideology of the bill’s sponsor (with the adjusted discuss in Chapter 2), the salience of the bill, 
the log of the word count, whether the bill had a restrictive or closed rule, whether the bill was an 
appropriations bill or a conference report, and the number of cosponsors.  In addition, I control 
for each session of Congress. 
 The results of the duration model are reported in Table 4.3.  Legislation which receives 
an MTR with instructions takes a significantly longer time to pass than non-MTR bills.  The 
hazard ratio is below one, indicating that MTRs increase the passage time of legislation.  Thus, it 
does appear that MTRs serve a dilatory function in addition to cross-pressuring.  Table 4.3 
reports that neither the ideological position of the sponsor nor the salience of the bill impact 
passage time.  However, the complexity of the legislation (log of word count) significantly 
increases passage rate.  Legislation with closed rules pass at a much quicker rate than open rules, 
this makes sense as closed rules do not have any amendments debated on the floor, which save 
                                                             
17
 Cox Proportional Hazard models are recommended for most social science applications by Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones (2004), as long as data does not violate the proportional hazard assumption.  I have conducted the appropriate 
test and the data and it does not violate the assumption and thus the Cox model is appropriate for my purposes. 
84 
 
time.  Thus, the majority is focusing more attention of legislation with closed rules and insuring 
the pass quickly.  In addition, closed rules by definition cannot receive amendments, so no time 
is spent debating amendments. 
 Restrictive rules is not significant.  This is most likely because the amendments that are 
allowed under restrictive rules tend to be highly contested and result in more arduous debate.  
Appropriation bills take longer pass, likely due to the additional complexities of the budgetary 
process.  Conference reports pass significantly faster than pre-conference legislation.  In 
addition, the hazard ratio for conference reports is 2.5 which indicates a very substantive impact.  
The number of cosponsors significantly slows passage, however, the actually effect of each 
additional cosponsor is very small as the hazard ratio is only slightly smaller than one.  
 Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the survival curve for the duration model.  The survival curve 
indicates the chances of a piece of legislation surviving (not passing) at any given point in time.  
Figure 4.2 shows the survival curve for legislation the first 24 hours after it receives its initial 
floor action.  Figure 4.3 shows the survival curve for the first week.  These survival curves allow 
for a more substantive interpretation of the results from Table 4.3, particularly regarding the 
impact of MTRs with instructions. 
 The survival curves highlight the findings of Table 4.2 and show that legislation that 
received and MTR has a greater chance of "surviving," i.e., a lower chance of passing at any 
given time.  In other words, MTR bills take longer to pass.  However, as the curves show, for the 
first several hours, there is little difference in MTR and non-MTR legislation.  Furthermore, 
Figure 4.3 shows that after the first day of activity the curves begin to converge, indicating the 
effect of MTRs on passage time begin to wane rather early on and continues to until the end of  
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Table 4.3 Passage Rate of Contentious Legislation in the House 101
st
-110
th
  
                                                                             
Independent Variables  Hazard Ratio  
 
MTR with Instructions  0.718*** 
  (0.039)  
 
Adjusted Sponsor Ideology  0.810  
  (0.090) 
  
Salience  1.004  
  (0.002) 
  
Log of Word Count  0.843*** 
  (0.013) 
  
Closed Rules  1.322*** 
  (0.103) 
  
Restrictive Rules  0.913  
  (0.052) 
  
Appropriations Bill  0.786*** 
  (0.046)  
 
Conference Report  2.583*** 
  (0.220)  
 
Number of Cosponsors  0.998*** 
  (0.001)  
    
N  1977  
Log Likelihood  -12229  
Chi Squared  550.86   
Note: Hazard ratios are reported.  Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects for congressional sessions 
are not reported.  * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001.  
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Figure 4.3 Survival Curve of House Legislation: First Day 
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Figure 4.4 Survival Curve of House Legislation: First Week 
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the session.
18
   The survival curves are most divergent between approximately six and twelve 
hours after initial floor action.  During that six hour time frame, bills with MTR are 
approximately 10% more likely to survive.  This highlights two important findings regarding the 
impact of MTRs on passage rates.  First, MTRs have their largest effect on passage time during 
the first day of floor action and only for about six hours.  Second, even during their largest 
impact, MTRs only increase survival by about 10%.  Thus, while MTRs slows the House floor 
process to a statistically significant degree, they do not appear to have a large substantive effect.  
The results of Table 4.2 are likely driven by the fact that House rules state that all MTRs receive 
ten minutes of debate, which the majority party can easily take into account.  Thus, while MTRs 
are obstructing the majority, it seems unlikely that obstruction is the primary motivation behind 
the minority’s use of MTRs.  Ultimately, this finding bodes well for cross-pressuring. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter tests the end results of MTRs and provides support for cross-pressuring.  
Supporting MTRs increases the vote shares of majority members, and even more so for those 
from moderate districts.  These findings not only support the hypotheses of this chapter but the 
overarching logic of cross-pressuring.  Simply put, cross-pressuring states that moderate majority 
members are strategically placed in difficult positions where they must either vote against their 
party or constituents on MTRs.  The findings of this chapter so that this is indeed occurring, 
majority members from moderate districts are punished at the polls if they defect from the 
district on MTR votes, exactly what cross-pressuring claims.  Thus, this chapter confirms that the 
minority is able to design, implement, and reap the fruits of its own strategy. 
                                                             
18 Survival curves of the entire time frame, ranging from almost immediate passage to slightly less than two years, 
indicates than much after a week, there is little difference in the survival of MTR and non-MTR bills. 
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 The other two theories of MTR use do not fare as well as cross-pressuring.  Position-
taking finds some support in the fact that MTR support helps extreme minority members.  
However, minority members from moderate districts are hurt by MTR support, violating one of 
the hypotheses for position-taking.  Similarly, obstruction finds support through the finding that 
MTRs significantly slow the legislative process in the House.  On the other hand, the findings of 
the duration model indicate that while MTRs have a significant effect on passage time, their 
substantive impact is low.  This indicates that MTRs are not overly effective at obstructing or 
delaying the House process, undermining the very notion of the obstruction hypothesis.  The 
findings regarding position-taking and obstruction leave cross-pressuring in good standing.  
Cross-pressuring is the only theory which finds consistent and substantive results for each of its 
hypotheses, making it the theory that bests explains the effects of MTRs in the House of 
Representatives. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 The goal of this project is to establish the motion to recommit as an integral part of one of 
the House minority party’s main electoral strategy.  To this end, I conducted an exhaustive 
examination of this lone procedural prerogative of the House minority.  Specifically, I tested 
three different theories regarding the use and effects of MTRs: cross-pressuring, position-taking, 
and obstruction.  I argue throughout this project that cross-pressuring best explains the minority’s 
use of the MTR, indicating that the minority is strategically placing majority members in 
difficult position with the intention of causing electoral damage.  The empirical results of this 
project overwhelmingly supports cross-pressuring. 
Cross-Pressuring and MTRs 
 Cross-pressuring through MTRs states that the minority party in the House designs the 
instructions on MTRs to be attractive to policy moderates.  It does this so that majority members 
from moderate districts are legitimately cross-pressured to choose between their constituents and 
their party.  The goal of this strategy is for the minority to place itself in a win-win situation.  If 
majority members vote for the MTR, the minority can claim bi-partisan support for its position 
or obtain a policy victory if the MTR passes.  On the other hand, if majority members vote 
against the MTR, and thus against their district, they increase their electoral vulnerability.  Either 
outcome benefits the minority. However, MTRs are unlikely to pass (Oleszek 2011; Clarke 
2012; Lynch 2008; Roberts 2005) and are typically whipped by majority leaders (Ansolabehere 
et al. 2001; Jenkins et al 2005; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; Sinclair 2002; Marshall 2005; Cox 
and Poole 2002). Thus, it is unlikely that the minority receives policy gains from cross-
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pressuring.  Yet, several findings from this project indicate that the primary motivation behind 
the minority’s use of the MTR is electoral.   
 First, the minority is more likely to offer MTRs on extreme legislation or legislation with 
a restrictive rule.  The minority is, therefore, using requesting MTRs in situations where they can 
legitimately cross-pressure majority members from moderate districts, and need to go outside of 
the normal amending process to do so.  When legislation is extreme, moderate districts should 
prefer the MTR with instructions and punish members for supporting the legislation.  
Furthermore, the findings of Chapter 3 reveal that majority leaders are less likely to allow 
defections of extreme legislation.  This indicates that the minority is rationally implementing 
cross-pressuring and using it when it is most effective.  In addition, the minority requests MTRs 
on legislation with restrictive rules.  Majority members find it more difficult to amend legislation 
under restrictive rules, making the MTR the only chance to show moderate voters they are not 
extreme.  Thus, the very situations the minority chooses to request the MTR suggests they are 
implementing a cross-pressuring strategy. 
 Second, not only is cross-pressuring directed at moderate majority members, but actually 
attracts MTR support from these members.  Majority members from moderate districts are more 
likely to support MTR, especially when the legislation is salient and voters are more likely to 
notice.  This indicates that majority members, particularly those from moderate districts, are 
worried about the electoral consequences of MTR votes.  Furthermore, this project indicates that 
the majority party itself is aware that MTRs pose electoral risk for its members.  It appears that 
the majority offers vote options (King and Zeckhauser 2003) on MTRs when the legislation is 
moderate, in order to stave off any electoral threats to its members.  However, on extreme 
legislation, the majority can afford fewer vote options, placing its members in dangerous 
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situations.  This indicates that minority attempts to cross-pressure majority members are 
successful. 
 Third, cross-pressuring is an effective electoral strategy.  MTR support significantly and 
substantively increases vote shares among majority members.  More specifically, MTR support 
has a much greater impact on majority members from moderate districts.  On face value, this 
finding is rather simple; when members vote with the district (for the MTR, in this case), their 
vote share is higher, when the vote against the district (against the MTR), they are punished at 
the polls.  However, the implications of this finding are deeper.  This finding suggests that voters 
notice MTR votes, through a combination of attentive publics (Arnold 1990; Bovitz and Carson 
2006) and minority press releases (Peters and Rosenthal 2010), and punish or reward members 
accordingly.  Thus, the win-win situation that the minority attempted to design by using cross-
pressuring is real.  Not only are the policy victories of cross-pressuring a possibility, but also the 
electoral gains.   
 The empirical support for cross-pressuring indicates that the minority is not a silent 
partner in the House.  The minority party can design, implement, and reap the benefits from its 
own strategy.  It can and does actively participate in the House legislative process, in a way that 
improves its own condition.  In contrast to the majority, the minority is still weak.  The majority 
maintains the capabilities to dominate House policy and procedure.  However, the minority does 
a viable electoral strategy they can implement and benefit from.  This is the first known project 
which shows the minority possess the tools to create and execute its own strategy, independent of 
majority or institutional factors. 
 While this project establishes cross-pressuring as a viable strategy for the minority party 
in the House and that it can be executed through MTRs, it leaves several questions open for 
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further research.  First, additional research needs to establish if there are any other procedures the 
House minority exploits for electoral gain.  Can amendments, committee behavior, or another 
small procedure be used to cross-pressure, or influence elections through another mechanism?  
Second, further research needs to test the scope and implementation of cross-pressuring in the 
Senate.  Does the Senate minority cross-pressure, to what extent and how?  Answering this 
question helps determine is cross-pressuring is a universal strategy or only present in the House.  
Third, research must examine the majority’s response to cross-pressuring.  This study suggests 
the majority’s response is to offer vote options on cross-pressured procedural votes, however, 
this is an implication, not an empirical finding.  Thus, further research is needed to discover 
exactly how the majority acts in the face of cross-pressuring.    
Position-Taking and MTRs 
  Position-taking argues that the minority uses MTRs in order to publically establish their 
preferred policy position.  Since the minority possesses few tools to influence policy in the 
House, it must rely on MTRs in order to do so.  The empirical results of this project do not 
indicate that this is the primary motivation behind the minority’s use of MTRs.  Bill salience 
does not influence MTR requests.  The minority is more concerned with the ideological position 
of the bill than the salience.  Position-taking predicts that salience should be the predominant 
predictor of MTR requests, which is not the case.  Position-taking also predicts that district 
ideology should be driving minority MTR support.  However, member’s ideology appears to be 
the best predictor of how minority members vote on MTRs.  This indicates that minority party 
leaders are allowing minority members to use their own discretion on MTR votes.  If they were 
concerned about position-taking, they would not allow this discretion.  Furthermore, if position-
taking is a successful strategy, then minority members should be electorally rewarded for 
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supporting MTRs.  In reality, only minority members from extreme districts receive this benefit.  
Thus, all of the major predictions of position-taking throughout this project are falsified. 
 When combined with the findings regarding cross-pressuring, the position-taking 
findings indicate that the minority is indeed implementing an electoral strategy.  However, it is 
not concerned with making itself look good to its own voters, but making majority members 
defect from their constituents.  Thus, the minority in the House is using an aggressive tacit that 
seeks to damage the majority, not simply highlight the positive qualities and positions of itself.  
Furthermore, the resounding support for cross-pressuring indicates that the minority is fashioning 
MTRs to be moderate, not necessarily at its preferred location.  Making it seem unlikely the 
minority is implementing a strategy of position-taking. 
  The empirical results of position-taking bring to light theoretical problems with position-
taking.  Position-taking through MTRs only helps those minority members who need it least, 
those from extreme districts.  Minority members from moderate districts are motivated to not 
support MTRs, as it actually harms their vote shares.  Thus, as a strategy position-taking fails to 
help the minority members who most need the electoral boost predicted by position-taking. 
 This project is rather conclusive that the minority party is not using MTRs for position-
taking purposes.  However, further research is needed to determine if position-taking is a viable 
strategy elsewhere in the House, or through other procedures.  It is unlikely that future studies 
will find support for position-taking as Wolfensberger (2007) argues that MTRs are the only 
procedural available to the minority that allows for position-taking.  Still, it is possible that 
position-taking is used by the minority in the House, just not through MTRs. 
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Obstruction and MTRs 
 In addition to disconfirming position-taking, this project also refutes obstruction as a 
motivation for introducing MTRs.  There is no relationship between majority cohesion and the 
number of MTRs requested.  There is some evidence that obstruction accounts for minority 
voting patterns on MTRs, however, this finding could also be attributed to member’s ideology, 
not their desire to obstruct.  Finally, MTRs do not substantially delay the House legislative 
process, making them inefficient tools for obstruction.  Thus, all of the hypotheses stemming 
from obstruction remain unsupported. 
 This is the first project that directly tests the ability of the minority party to obstruct the 
majority.  I found that MTRs to not substantively alter or delay the House process.  However, 
future research should implement similar methods to test whether minority party obstruction is 
possible in the House.  Research should focus on believed forms of obstruction such as points of 
order (Dion 1997), discharge motions (Binder 1997), or journal votes (Rohde 1991).  Ultimately, 
this research would help establish the full extent of the majority’s agenda control. 
Implications 
 The overall implication of this project is that the House minority is rational entity that 
creates and implements its own strategy, sees the strategy through its completion and reaps its 
benefits.  The minority uses whatever tools are available, in this case, the motion to recommit, 
and manipulates them for its own betterment.  In the case of MTRs, the minority uses them to 
strategically cross-pressure majority members from moderate districts, in order to produce better 
electoral outcomes.  The minority is not simply a passive participant in the legislative process, 
but an active and aggressive advisory of the majority, which capitalizes on opportunities to cause 
electoral strife to the majority. 
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